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CHARACTERIZATION OF INTERSTATE 
ARRANGEMENTS: WHE.N IS A 
COMPACT NOT A COMPACT? 
David E. Engdahl* 
N OTWITHSTANDING the relative lack of attention which the sub-ject has received from legal scholars, one of the most significant 
developments in American federalism during the past forty, and 
especially the past twenty, years has been the increasing employment 
· of formal interstate arrangements, commonly referred to as "com-
pacts," for dealing ·with governmental problems affecting more than 
a single state. Prior to the twentieth century, formal arrangements 
bearing this name were used only for the settlement of interstate 
boundaries and for similar purposes; but since the successful experi-
ment with the Port of New York Authority1 and the significant 
study of "compacts" by Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis2 ex-
hibited the modem potential for such arrangements, "compacts" 
have been increasingly recognized as a highly versatile device of 
state government. 
The most common type of "compact" currently being concluded 
merely creates a study or advisory commission of representatives 
from each participating state. The commissioners are instructed to 
recommend to their respective individual states coordinated pro-
grams of legislation designed to deal with whatever problems of 
conservation, health, safety, or similar matters the "compact" may 
contemplate. Some of the modem "compacts," however, have a more 
immediate effect upon individuals; typical are. those designed to 
make more equitable the distribution of taxes to be collected by 
several states from interstate carriers. Interstate authorities founded 
upon "compacts" govern some of the nation's major ports and 
associated facilities; others operate interstate bridges and ferries. 
The "compact" device has even been used to organize an interstate 
school district for neighboring communities within different states. 
Similarly, increasing consideration is being given to the creation of 
• Member of the Michigan Bar; Legislative Analyst, Legislative Research Center, 
University of Michigan Law School.-Ed. 
l. The Port of New York Authority, created by "compact" in 1921, continues to 
be the best illustration of the significance of modem interstate "compacts." For a 
short, recent account of the Authority's activities, see Goldstein, An Authority in 
Action-An Account of the Port of New York Authority and Its Recent Activities, 
26 LAW &: CONTEMP. PROB. 715 (1961). 
2. Frankfurter &: Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in 
Interstate Adjustments, M YALE L.J. 685 (1925). 
[63] 
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governmental organs founded upon "compacts" for dealing with 
the problems of interstate metropolitan areas.8 
The real increase in the use of "compacts" is still very recent, 
so there has as yet been little significant litigation concerning these 
instruments. For this reason, relatively few lawyers have had suffi-
cient exposure to the subject to discover what an unhappy state the 
law of "compacts" is in. However, if the present trend toward their 
increased use continues, interstate authorities and agencies founded 
upon "compacts" may be expected to become as familiar to the 
average lawyer as conventional governmental agencies are today. 
This article is not intended to anticipate all of the legal problems 
which are sure to arise in the judicial process of integrating this 
new device-or new employment of an ancient device-with the 
other elements of mid-twentieth century American federalism. It 
focuses on only the one most basic problem: the applicability to 
these interstate arrangements of the tenth section of the first article 
of the United States Constitution. It is to discourage the premature 
conclusion that all of these modem arrangements necessarily fall 
within the scope of that constitutional provision that the term 
"compact" is set in quot~tion marks. It is hoped that this technique 
will also suggest the inexactness of its common usage. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF CHARACTERIZATION UNDER ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 10 
A. "Treaty" and "Agreement or Compact" 
Article I, section 10, of the Constitution provides: 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Con-
federation .... [clause I] 
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ... enter 
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a 
foreign Power .... [clause 3, the compact clause] 
The question immediately arises whether a particular interstate 
arrangement is to be considered a "treaty" or rather an "agreement 
or compact" under this section. The answer which has received judi-
3. For a general survey of "compact" activities, see the sections on "Interstate 
Compacts" in the biennial volumes of The Book of the States, published by the 
Council of State Governments. For a recent summary of the development of "com• 
pacts" and their modern significance, see Grad, Federal-State Compact-A New Ex• 
periment in Co-operative Federalism, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 825, 834-40 (1963). For some 
thoughts on future applications of "compacts," particularly in metropolitan areas, 
see Dixon, Constitutional Bases for Regionalism-Centralization; Interstate Compacts; 
Federal Regional Taxation, 33 GEo, WASH. L. REv. 47 (1964). 
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cial recognition' is that offered in Joseph Story's Commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States, first published in 1833. Story 
suggested that the absolute prohibition in the first clause of the 
section might be taken ''to apply to treaties of a political character"5 
and that the qualified prohibition in the third clause pertained to 
"what might be deemed mere private rights of sovereignty."6 With 
respect to the latter category, the fact that congressional consent is 
required in every instance would, in Story's view, "check any in-
fringement of the rights of the national government.''7 Story made 
no pretensions of having deduced this interpretation of article I, 
section 10, from any source other than his own imagination. He had 
rejected the authority of an earlier interpreter of the section8 and 
frankly based his own interpretation upon conjecture. Recognizing 
the apparent ambiguity of the constitutional language,9 Story ex-
pressed his interpretation of it in highly tentative terms and confided 
a disposition to suppose that the original reading of the prohibition 
in the first clause might have been different and more supportive of 
his suggested interpretation.10 
It is evident, however, from an investigation of the practice.,of 
the states prior to the time of Story's writing that the interpretation 
he put forward was not that commonly held even in 1833. Story 
included treaties of cession under the absolute prohibition of the 
first clause,11 yet we know of cessions by states to the general govern-
ment, as well as to one another, even after the Constitution was 
ratified.12 Moreover, Story included under the qualified prohibition 
of the third clause all interstate boundary settlements and "other 
internal regulations for the mutual comfort, and convenience of 
states, bordering on each other."13 During the first decades of the 
4. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519-20 (1893). See also text accompany-
ing notes 123-24 infra. 
5. 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU110N OF THE UNITED STATES § 1397 
(1st ed. 1833) (in subsequent editions, § 1403). 
6. Ibid. 
7. Ibid. 
8. See text accompanying note 75 infra. 
9. 3 STORY, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1397, at 271 n.I. 
10. Id. § 1397, at 271 n.2. 
11. "[T]reaties of a political character • • • treaties of cession of sovereignty, or 
conferring internal political jurisdiction, or external political dependence, or general 
co=ercial privileges.'' Id. § 1397. 
12. E.g., North Carolina's cession to the United States in 1789, see Burton's Lessee 
v. Williams, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 529 (1818); Georgia's cession to the United States of 
land on the disputed boundary between Georgia and Florida, see Harcourt v. Gail-
lard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523 (1827). As to interstate cessions, see, e.g., Burton's 
Lessee v. Williams, supra, at 536. 
13. 3 STORY, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1397. "[Q]uestions of boundary; interests in 
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constitutional Union, however, at least three boundary settlements 
were concluded between various states without any congressional 
approval,14' and their validity was never questioned.1rs Similarly, 
interstate arrangements for public improvements were made with-
out the thought of their being affected by this constitutional pro-
vision.16 Nevertheless, despite its conjectural origin and its incon-
sistency with contemporary practical construction of article I, section 
10, Story's explanation came, with the passage of time, to share that 
aura of authority which his other studies had earned for him. 
B. Scope of "Agreement or Compact": The Rule of 
Virginia v. Tennessee 
Since the beginning of the second half of the nineteenth century, 
attention has been focused less upon the distinction between "treaties" 
and "agreements or compacts" in the constitutional provision than 
upon the inclusive scope of the terms "agreement" and "compact" 
themselves. New occasions for, and new varieties of, interstate co-
operation engendered impatience with the onerous requirement of 
congressional consent, and disputes arose as to whether particular 
kinds of interstate arrangements were encompassed by the compact 
clause at all. In a curious feat of judicial doubletalk, Story's dis-
tinction between "treaties" and "agreements or compacts" was 
applied to the new task of exempting all but a narrow class of 
"agreements or compacts" from the requirement of congressional 
consent. 
By the end of the nineteenth century, and after a course of 
judicial development discussed in more detail in subsequent pages, 
this perversion of Story's already tenuous construction had received 
the endorsement of the United States Supreme Court in Virginia v. 
Tennessee.17 Story had argued that all interstate arrangements18 
land, situate in the territory of each other; and other internal regulations • • • ." 
Ibid. 
14. Tennessee-Virginia Boundary Compact of 1803 (1 Scott, Tenn. Laws, ch. 58, 
at 798; Va. Rev. Code, 1819, 63); North Carolina-South Carolina Boundary Compact 
of 1815 (N.C. Rev. Acts, 1796-1820, ch. 885, at 1318; 1 Cooper, S.C. Stat. 419): 1 North 
Carolina-Tennessee .Boundary Compact of 1821 (2 N.C. Rev. Stat. 1837, 96; Tenn. 
Acts 1821, ch. 35, at 45). 
15. The Tennessee-Virginia .Boundary Compact of 1803 was in litigation as early 
as 1818, but it was not suggested that the lack of express consent impaired its validity. 
Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212 (1818). It was this same compact which 
was held valid, notwithstanding the compact clause, in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 
U.S. 503 (1893). See text accompanying notes 17-21 and 130-32 infra. 
16. See notes 114-26 infra and accompanying text. 
17. 148 U.S. 503 (1893). 
18. If the language used in his Commentaries left any question as to Story's 
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must be submitted for the consent of Congress "in order to check 
any infringement of the rights of the national government"1~ and 
that those arrangements which were "of a political character" feli 
within the absolute prohibition of the first clause.20 However, in 
Virginia v. Tennessee hi~ argument was quoted and used ~ if it 
were authority for the quite different proposition that the only 
arrangements which require consent are -those which will affect 
"the political power or influence" of particular states and "encroach 
... upon the full and free exercise of Federal authority."21 The 
fact that this "rule" of Virginia v. Tennessee has been widely re-
garded as dictum22 has not prevented its use as precedent in numer-
ous subsequent cases.28 
C. Analytical Vices of Virginia v. Tennessee 
The rule which results from the juxtaposition of Story's own 
construction and that imposed by the Court in Virginia v. Tennes-
see is a curious one indeed. The opinion states that an "agree-
ment or compact" upsetting to the political balance of the Union, 
or encroaching upon the free exercise of federal authority, can 
be concluded only with congressional consent. However, an "agree-
ment or compact" with such political effects is an absolutely pro-
hibited "treaty"24 and cannot be validated even by Congress. More-
over, if such an arrangement actually encroached upon federal 
authority, it would not be approved by a responsible Congress and 
might well be judici~lly invalidated even if it were. As a matter of 
fact, Congress commonly inserts provisos in its consent acts and 
resolutions specifically preserving full federal authority over the 
opinion of the comprehensiveness of the requirement, that question was resolved 
by Story's entire concurrence in Mr. Justice Taney's all-inclusive construction of 
the compact clause in Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840). See text 
accompanying note 109 infra. 
19. 3 STORY, op. cit. supra note 5, § 1397. 
20. Ibid. 
21. 148 U.S. at 520 (1893). 
22. See, e.g., THURSBY, INTERSTATE CooPERATION 74 (1953); Bruce, The Compacts 
and Agreements of States With One Another and With Foreign Powers, 2 MINN. L. 
REV. 500 (1918); Dunbar, Interstate Compacts and Congressional Consent, 36 VA. L. 
REv. 753 (1950); Dutton, Compacts and Trade Barrier Controversies, 16 IND. L.J. 204 
(1940). 
23. See cases cited note 32 infra. 
24. If instead of simply serving to "mark and define that which actually existed 
before, but was undefined and unmarkedt a boundary established by compact "is 
so run as to cut off an important and valuable portion of a State," this is essentially 
a cession which, in Story's view as quoted with approval by the Court, falls within 
clause one, as a "treaty." See 148 U.S. at 519-20. 
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subject matter.25 An "agreement or compact" having no such effects 
could be readily approved, but such an "agreement or compact" 
does not, under Virginia v. Tennessee, require consent. In other 
words, if consent is required, it cannot be given; and if consent 
could be given, it is not required. 
If it were left to Congress to decide whether a pai;ticular "com-
pact" actually would have political effects, or actually would en-
croach upon federal authority, then the compact clause, as interpreted 
in Virginia v. Tennessee, could retain some meaning. Congress 
would express its determination of that issue in each instance by 
granting or withholding its consent. However, under the rule of 
Virginia v. Tennessee as applied by the courts, the responsibility 
for making this determination has not been left to Congress. For 
example, even though boundary "compacts" as a class are a prime 
example of arrangements capable of disrupting the political balance 
of the Union,26 particular boundary compacts have been found by 
the courts to have no political effects and therefore to be exempt 
from the compact clause.27 Thus, the responsibility for determining 
whether the potential for ill effects has been realized in a particular 
instance has been claimed by the courts. 
The test of the scope of the compact clause has been put by the 
courts in terms of the actual effects of particular compacts, rather 
than the potential effects of the species. Under Virginia v. Tennes-
see, as applied by the courts, it is the "compacting" states, second-
guessed by the courts, that must determine whether a particular 
"compact" actually impairs federal authority or has political effects. 
If it does, congressional consent would be ineffectual; if it does not, 
then congressional consent would be superfluous. Thus, the provi-
sion for congressional consent to compacts is, in effect, written out 
of the Constitution and replaced with a criterion for validity under 
which congressional consent, or the lack of it, is irrelevant. 
However, the rule of Virginia v. Tennessee has not been applied 
25. Such provisos have a history of more than a century and a quarter. In its 
consent to a "compact" in 1834, Congress said: "Provided, That nothing therein con-
tained shall be construed to impair or in any manner affect, any right of jurisdiction 
of the United States in and over the islands or waters which form the subject of 
the said agreement." Act of June 28, 1934, ch. 126, 4 Stat. 711. Of course, state 
action in spheres of federal competence is no encroachment upon federal authority 
so long as Congress retains its paramount power over the subject. 
26. The most prolific writers on compact law cite boundary settlements by compact 
as "the clearest examples of arrangements affecting the political balance of our fed-
eralism." See ZIMMERMAN 8: WENDELL, THE LAW AND UsE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 23 
(1961). . 
27. See North Carolina v. Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914); Town of Searsburg v. 
Town of Woodford, 76 Vt. 370, 57 Atl. 961 (1904). 
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extrajudicially in the same manner that it has been applied by the 
courts. Advisers to the Council of State Govemments,28 for example, 
take the position that interstate boundary settlements and "com-
pacts" concerning jurisdiction over boundary waters all require 
consent,29 even though, "in actuality, there have been no compacts 
adopted or proposed in our history which have really affected that 
political balance."30 They urge that: 
The real test of the need for Congressional consent in the 
present day is the degree to which an interstate agreement may 
conflict with federal law or federal interests. If it runs any 
danger of con-flict with federal law or the doctrine of pre-
emption, then the need for Congressional consent is clearly 
indicated.31 • 
Thus, the rule has been made to seem more plausible by stating it 
in terms of the possible, rather than the actual, effects of "compacts." 
This extra-judicial understanding of the 'rule of Virginia v. Ten-
nessee serves as the standard by which "compacting" states today 
try to determine the necessity of consent. The best criterion by 
which to judge the value of this reformulated rule is not its logical 
or analytical validity, or even its consonance with the rule actually 
applied by the courts, but rather its practical effects. 
D. Practical Vices ·ot Virginia v. Tennessee 
The application of the rule of Virginia v. Tennessee to specific 
"compacts" is not easy. The mere statement of the rule makes it 
appear that only the exceptional "agreement or compact" will fall 
within the conditional interdiction of the compact clause; indeed, 
in every case since Virginia v. Tennessee in which an interstate 
arrangement has been challenged for lack of congressional consent, 
it has been held exempt from the consent requirement.32 N everthe-
28. The Council of State Governments is a joint governmental agency created, 
supported, and directed by the fifty states. Much of its work consists of participating 
in the drafting and implementation of interstate "compacts.'' 
29. This conclusion. is inconsistent with the decided cases. See cases cited note 27 
supra. 
30. ZIMMEIU.rAN 8: WENDELL, op. cit. supra ncite 26, at 23. The Southern Con-
federacy was an arrangement falling within the terms of Art. I, § 10, cl. 1, absolutely 
prohibiting any "treaty, alliance, or confederation.'' See Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 
176 (1877). 
31. ZIMMERMAN 8: WENDELL, op. cit. supra note 26, at 23. (Emphasis added.) 
32. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914); Wharton v. Wise, 
153 U.S. 155 (1894); State v. Doe, 149 Conn. 216, 178 A.2d 271 (1962); Duncan v. 
Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1953); Dixie Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Martin, 278 Ky. 
705, 129 S.W.2d 181, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 609 (1939); Roberts Tobacco Co. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue, 322 Mich. 519, 34 N.W.2d 54 (1948); Ham v. Maine-New Hampshire 
Interstate Bridge Authority, 92 N.H. 268, 30 A.2d 1 (1943); Landes v. Landes, 1 
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less, draftsmen have been so uncertain of the scope and application 
of the compact clause that. until very recently nearly every formal 
interstate arrangement has been submitted for congressional con-
sent. 83 Congress, no less than the states, seems uncertain as to the 
extent of its power to review interstate "agreements or compacts." 
Consent was denied to the Southern Regional Education Compact84 
after congressional discussion had raised the argument that consent 
was not required;811 the interested states, sharing that view, 86 have 
since implemented the "compact" without congressional approval. 
Nevertheless, two subsequent "compacts" designed for purposes 
substantially identical to this one-the New England Higher Educa-
tion Compact37 and the Western Regional Education Compact88-
have been submitted by their parties and have been granted con-
gressional consent. 
Recently, the states have become more bold, insisting that consent 
to certain "compacts" is unnecessary39 and even proceeding without 
it.40 However, their judgment has not yet been subjected to judicial 
scrutiny in any of these instances, and it has already been noted that 
in some respects the judgment of their advisers conflicts with specific 
judicial precedents. 41 Even the courts have not reached agreement 
on the application of the compact clause to specific types of arrange-
ments. For example, the New Hampshire court42 applied Virginia 
v. Tennessee to exempt from the clause a "compact" substantially 
the same as those that were held subject to it in two United States 
N.Y.2d 358, 135 N.E.2d 562, 153 N.Y.S.2d 14, appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 948 (1956); 
McHenry County v. :Brady, 37 N.D. 59, 163 N.W. 540 (1917); Town of Searsburg v. 
Town of Woodford, 76 Vt. 370, 57 Atl. 961 (1904). 
33. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERSTATE CoMPAcrs 1783-1956, 25·46 
(1956). Current lists of compacts pending or proposed are published in the Council's 
biennial The Book of the States. 
34. See Ferguson, Interstate Agreements, 39 KY. L.J. 31 (1950); Ferguson, The Legal 
Basis for a Southern University-Interstate Agreements Without Congressional Con• 
sent, 38 KY. L.J. 347 (1950). 
35. See ZIMMERMAN 8: WENDELL, op. cit. supra note 26, at 21. 
36. See authorities cited note 34 supra. For a discussion representing the contrary 
view, see Dunbar, supra note 22. 
37. Consented to by Congress, Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1089, 68 Stat. 982. 
38. Consented to by Congress, Act of Aug. 8, 1953, ch. 380, 67 Stat. 490. 
39. See text accompanying note 45 infra. 
40. Consent was not requested for the recent Compact on Juveniles, the Corrections 
Compacts, or the Welfare Services Compacts. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1964· 
1965 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 276-77 (hereinafter cited :BOOK OF STATES); 1962-1963 
BOOK OF STATES 268; 1960-1961 BOOK OF STATES 245-46. • 
41. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra. 
42. Ham v. Maine-New Hampshire Interstate :Bridge Authority, 92 N.H. 268, 30 
A.2d 1 (1943). Actually, congressional consent had been granted in the Act of July 28, 
1937, 50 Stat. 538; the court, unaware of this fact, held consent unnecessary. 
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Supreme Court decisions-43 Those persons who have undertaken to 
advise the states with respect to the applicability of the compact 
clause to particular arrangements have done as well as is possible 
under the handicap of the inherent ambiguity of the enigmatic 
rule of Virginia v. Tennessee; c~rtainty simply is not possible under 
that rule. ·H -
Uncertainty of application is only one of the vices of the rule of 
Virginia v. Tennessee. A second problem is manifested in the devel-
opments which have recently induced states to make bolder assertions 
of exemptions from the compact clause. There has been a pro-
nounced tendency on the part of Congress to exert sweeping powers 
of supervision and control over "compacts" and "compact" agencies. 
In an effort to summarize the situation, the Executive Director of 
the Council of State Governments stated: 
The investigation of the Port of New York Authority by a 
Congressional committee, the sweeping demands made for all 
books, papers and records of the agency, and the subsequent 
prosecution of its Executive Director make clear the lengths to 
which Congress has gone in asserting authority over compacts 
to which it has given its consent. Also within the past year 
[1962], bills granting consent to compacts have been amended 
in various restrictive ways, including the adding of specific 
provisions granting Congress and its committees the right to 
examine all books, papers and records concerning operations 
under the compacts. 
The states have strongly opposed these attempts by Congress 
to interfere in interstate programs. Resolutions expressing 
vigorous opposition have been adopted by [e.g.] the General 
Assembly of the States [and] ·the Governors' Conference .... 
Nevertheless, the fight goes on. Until it is won, compacts 
should not be submitted for consent unless it is completely 
clear that consent is necessary for the compact to become 
effective.45 
43. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri :Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Delaware 
River Joint ToJ,I :Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419 (1940). 
44. There is simply no merit in the exuberant acclamation of the rule of Virginia 
v. Tennessee as "an exceedingly useful rule because it permits the maximum degree 
of flexibility compatible with safeguarding the national interest." ZIMMERMAN & 
WENDELL, op. cit. supra note 26, at 22. It is indeed flexible; "flaccid" might be the 
better term. It is so limp that when applied to practical affairs it sets no certain 
or unambiguous line. 
45. Crihfield, The States and the Council of State Governments-Annual Report 
of the Executive Director to the Board of Managers of the Council, 36 STATE Gov'T 
29, 68 (1963). "Another disturbing element regarding interstate compacts has been the 
increasing tendency of Congress to seek control over compacts by the attachment of 
far-reaching conditions to Congressional c:onsent legislation." Crihfield, The States 
and the Council of State Governments, 35 STATE Gov'T 20, 65 (1962). See also the 
_ summaries by Zimmerman & Wendell, Interstate Compacts, in 1964-1965 Boo:r. OF 
STATES 269; 1962-1963 BOOK OF STATES 263. 
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The justification claimed for these attempts at greater federal 
control is the protection of federal authority from encroachment by 
the states.46 Of course, any state act touching an area of federal com-
petence is pro tanto subject to the paramount power of Congress.47 
However, Virginia v. Tennessee makes relationship to the sphere of 
federal competence the test of inclusion under the compact clause. 
As understood and applied in practice, this rule provides that if a 
projected "compact" may in any particular touch upon an area of 
federal competence, then the whole scheme is brought within the 
compact clause. The issue thus becomes not whether Congress can 
qualify its consent to state action in the federal sphere, but whether 
it can qualify the states' power to deal, in the same "compact," with 
strictly state concerns; not whether Congress can require periodic 
reports by, or conduct investigations into, "compact" agency activi-
ties affecting federal interests, but whether it can require complete 
reports and conduct comprehensive investigations of all activities 
under a sanctioned "compact," however unrelated to federal con-
cerns; not whether Congress can require supplementary consent 
before states may grant to a "compact" agency additional powers 
which may touch upon federal concerns, but whether it can prevent 
states from conferring upon such agencies additional powers as to 
matters wholly within the states' own domain; not whether Congress 
can vindicate its paramount authority in its own area of competence 
by rescinding its permission for state activity in that area, but wheth-
er it can, by repealing its consent, dissolve arrangements and obliga-
tions which are strictly within the states' sphere of competence. 
46. This was the avowed objective of the congressional committee which investi• 
gated the New York Port Authority. See United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588 
(D.D.C. 1961). "Another type of restrictive provision found in recent consent legis• 
lation limits the compact agency to the performance of the enumerated functions 
and requires congressional consent for each new or additional duty imposed on the 
agency by the compacting states. In imposing this kind of restriction, Congress has doubt• 
less been motivated by a desire to protect the exercise of its constitutional responsi• 
bilities against erosion by fait accompli and the possible application thereto of a 
doctrine of implied consent." Celler, Congress, Compacts, and Interstate Authorities, 
26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 682, 689 (1961). 
47. The major factor that persuaded the circuit court to reverse the decision in 
the Port Authority investigation case on a non-constitutional ground, thereby avoid• 
ing rendering judgment on the constitutional issues respecting the scope of congres• 
sional power under the compact clause, was the argument that "under our system 
of government the Constitution is paramount, and the Constitution gives to Congress 
certain plenary powers, as for example those in the field of interstate commerce and 
that of national defense. With the choice of acting pursuant to any or all of these 
plenary powers continuously available to it, Congress has at its disposal abundant 
authority to supervise and regulate the activities of operational compacts in such a 
way as to insure that no violence is done by these compacts to more compelling 
federal concerns." Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
371 U.S. 902 (1962). 
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The states readily admit the paramount authority of Congress 
within the sphere of federal competence, and they do not deny that 
Congress may override "compact" activities encroaching upon that 
sphere.48 What they decry is the assertion of a congressional power 
extending beyond this sphere, rationalized as legislation enacted 
pursuant to the compact clause.49 However, this extraordinary power 
is vested in Congress by the holding in Virginia v. Tennessee that 
the presence of federal competence is the test of the scope of the 
compact clause. So long as this decision is followed, the only prospect 
for less federal control over non-federal facets of interstate "com-
pacts" lies in· congressional self-restraint. As noted previously, it is 
the contrary quality which has been evidenced in Congress for the 
past several years. 
The constit1,:1tional requirement of congressional approval before 
an "agreement or compact" can come into effec_t has also given color 
to the doctrine that a sanctioned compact is a federal statute. This 
doctrine, unsound as it is, is still subscribed to by the United States 
Supreme Court.50 Moreover, this theory forms the basis for certiorari 
review of state "compact" cases51 and for the remarkable rule that 
in construing a "compact" the intent of the parties is irrelevant and 
that of the consenting Congress controlling.52 The final vice of the 
rule in Virginia v. Tennessee is that it permits the application of 
this doctrine and its implications to a broader variety of interstate 
arrangements than would othe~ise be required. 
E. Objective of the Present Study 
It should not be necessary to detail more fully either the prac-
tical inadequacies of the rule of Virginia v. Tennessee or its analyt-
ical infirmities. However, an explanation should be inserted here 
to dispel the concern of those who might discountenance the perti-
48. See the court's references to the argument for appellant in Tobin v. United 
States, 306 F .2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
49. See Resolution adopted by 53d annual meeting of the Governors' Conference, 
1961, in 34 STATE Gov'T 183, 188 (1961); Resolution adopted by 52nd annual meeting 
of the Governors' Conference, 1960, in 33 STATE Gov'T 182 (1960). 
50. The Court's earlier holding in Hinderlider v. La Plata River 8e Cherry Creek 
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), that a sanctioned compact is not a federal statute, 
was overruled in Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 
419 (1940). The Supreme Court's continued adherence to the "law of the Union" doc-
trine is demonstrated-and criticized-in Engdahl, Construction of Interstate Com-
pacts-A. Questionable Federal Question, 51 VA. L. REv. (October 1965). 
51. See West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); Delaware River 
Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn, supra note 50. 
52. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959). See Engdahl, 
supra note 50. 
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nacity of this writer in challenging an interpretation of the compact 
clause which has long been acquiesced in by the Supreme Court 
and by every inferior court which has considered the problem, as 
well as by virtually every modem commentator.' The answer is 
simple: no one--court or commentator-has heretofore attempted 
any comprehensive, critical analysis of the rule expressed in V ir-
ginia v. Tennessee. 153 This absence of critical analysis is typical of 
the whole field of compact law. Indeed, it accounts for the fact that 
certain courts54 and commentators55 are oblivious to the Supreme 
Court's holding that a sanctioned "compact" is a federal statute 
and the reversal of the Court's earlier position with respect to this 
issue)i6 It accounts for the fact that, after six full years, the impact 
of the Supreme Court's holding that the intent of the parties is not 
controlling in "compact" construction51 has still not been felt by 
the states.58 In areas of the law where litigation is frequent enough 
that inadequacies of analysis can be corrected in the course of the 
judicial process itself, a more acquiescent attitude on the part of a 
commentator might be indicated. However, litigation of fundamental 
questions of "compact" law has been extremely rare, and even on 
those few occasions the judicial investigation into the issues has 
been quite shallow. Thus, a more rigorous and critical approach 
is justified and, indeed, required. 
The primary design of this article, however, is constructive. The 
writer seeks to advance a construction of the compact clause which 
is not only wholly compatible with the terms of the constitutional 
provision, but also far more effective in achieving all the ends sought 
unsuccessfully to be attained through the rule of Virginia v. Ten-
nessee. The ultimate objective is to determine what place the typical 
· modem interstate "compact" holds in the scheme of article I, section 
10, as actually intended by the framers. This exercise in constitu-
tional exegesis-this attempt to determine the actual intent of the 
53. In making this generalization, the writer does not overlook the several sig• 
nificant works dealing with the compact clause, which may have merit on other 
grounds. 
54. See, e.g., Rivoli Trucking Corp. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 
937, 939 (E.D.N.Y. 1958); Henderson v. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n, 
362 Pa. 475, 485, 66 A.2d 843, 848 (dictum), cert. denied, 3!18 U.S. 850 (1949). 
55. See, e.g., ZIMMERMAN &: WENDELL, op. cit. supra note 26, at 7; 81 C.J.S. States 
§ 10c, at 906 (1953); Abel, Ohio Tfalley Panorama, 54 W. ·VA. L. REv. 186, 229 (1952). 
56. See note 50 supra and accompanying text. 
57. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959), 
58. The widely held view of Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, supra 
note 57, is that it merely reinterprets certain language frequently used in congres• 
sional acts of consent. See ZIMMERMAN &: WENDELL, op. cit. supra note 26, at 5; Zim• 
merman &: Wendell, Interstate Compacts, in 1960-1961 Boo!': OF STATES 238. 
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eighteenth century constitutional draftsmen-will not by itself deter-
mine the proper construction of article I, section 10, for certainly 
constitutional history is not in itself the criterion of constitutional 
law. However, this examination of constitutional history is necessary 
not only to lay the foundation for the modern application of the 
constitutional provision which will be suggested here, but also to 
demonstrate that the rule of Virginia v. Tennessee is exegetically, as 
well as analytically, unsound. 
II. EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ORIGINS 
A. Source of the Distinction Between "Treaties" and 
"Agreements or Compacts" 
There is nothing in the records of the constitutional convention 
which manifests the intent of the framers as to the distinction be-
tween "treaties" and "agreements or compacts" or as to the types of 
arrangements they meant to include in the latter designation. The 
single reference to this provision in The Federalist seems, at first 
glance, to be equally unenlightening. "The prohibition against trea-
ties, alliances, and confederations makes a part of the existing 
articles of Union; and for reasons which need no explanation, is 
copied into the new Constitution."59 Similarly, it is stated in a com-
ment concerning the provision on compacts and agreements that "the 
remaining particulars of this clause fall within reasonings which are 
either so obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may be 
passed over without remark."60 However, this failure of the authors 
of the Federalist Papers to anticipate the confusion which would 
prevail in later generations over the construction of this section is 
less a disappointment than a clue. The very obviousness of the 
matter to the drafters, and presumably to the audience to which 
the Federalist Papers were addressed, suggests that there must have 
been some distinction between the terms which was widely enough 
recognized in the last quarter of the eighteenth century that it 
could be considered by men of that time to be fully developed and 
obvious. The next step in our study is, therefore, a simple one of 
historical inquiry. 
Chancellor Kent ·wrote in 1826 that "the most popular, and the 
most elegant writer on the law of nations, is Vattel, whose method 
59. THE FEDERAUST No. 44, at 193 (Beard ed. 1948) (Madison). The statement is 
not actually correct. The prohibition in the Articles was conditional; in the Consti-
tution it is absolute. A more thorough comparison of the analogous provisions in the 
Articles and the Constitution appears in the text accompanying notes 77-82 infra. 
60. THE FEl>~ No. 44, at 195 (Beard ed. 1948) (Madison). 
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has been greatly admired. He has been cited, for the last half 
century [since the Revolution], more freely than any one of the 
public jurists .... "61 It is the present writer's contention that the 
constitutional distinction between "treaties" and "agreements or 
compacts" was taken directly from Vattel. 
According to Vattel,62 the term "treaty" in its more proper sense 
designates those international arrangements which oblige a party to 
perform repeated acts as specified occasions arise. For example, a 
treaty of commerce may call for favorable treatment each time 
another nation's goods are received, or a treaty of alliance may call 
for support each time the ally is attacked. The terms "agreement"08 
and "compact,"64 on the other hand, both designate international 
61. 1 KENT, COl\!MENTARJF.S ON AMERICAN LAW 118 (1826). 
62. The relevant passages are in VATI'EL, LAw OF NATIONS, bk. II, ch. XII, §§ 152, 
153, 192; ch. XIV, § 206. Vattel's treatise was originally published in French in 1758, 
and an English translation printed in London for J. Newberry et al. appeared in 
1760; the evidence indicates that neither version of the work was circulated in the 
American colonies prior to 1775. See Reeves, The Influence of the Law of Nature 
Upon International Law in the United States, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 547 (1909). In 1775, 
some copies of Dumas' new edition in French (Amsterdam: van Harrevelt, 1775) 
were delivered to .Benjamin Franklin, and Franklin reported that the copy he kept 
"has been continually in the hands of the members of our Congress now sitting." 
Letter of Franklin to Dumas, Dec. 19, 1775, in 2 THE REvOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIO 
CoRitESPoNDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 64 (Wharton ed. 1889). Personal copies of the 
same edition were probably procured by other statesmen. It was not until 1787 that 
the treatise was again made available in English, and it is not certain whether either 
of the translated editions which appeared in that year (New York: .Berry &: Rogers; 
Dublin: White) was published early enough to have been available to the delegates 
to the Constitutional Convention before the distinction between "treaties" and 
"compacts and agreements" was introduced by the Committee of Detail in July. 2 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 169 (Farrand rev. ed. 1987). 
French was, of course, a familiar language to the educated men of that era. The fact 
that no English version of Vattel's treatise was apparently available to the Americans 
until at least 1787, and perhaps until after the Constitutional Convention had ad• 
journed, suggests that no particular edition in English can be ·expected necessarily to 
represent the early statesmen's precise understanding of Vattel. Rather than merely 
quoting an English version, therefore, this writer has chosen to summarize Vattcl as he 
believes Vattel was understood by the .Americans of that era, with explanatory foot• 
notes where they are needed. 
63. Vattel's two French terms accords and conventions (Livre II, ch. XII, § 153; 
Amsterdam: Dumas ed., 1775) can both be translated with equal accuracy by the 
single English word "agreements." 
64. Vattel's French word pacte was translated "pact" in the London edition of 
1760 and the Dublin edition of 1787. The- New York edition of 1787 is extremely rare, 
and although this writer has learned that copies are held in the Library of Congress and 
the New York City Public Library, he has been unable to.examine them. However, the 
fact that the New York edition and the Dublin edition published in the same year have 
the same number of pages, according to.the Library of Congress listings, suggests that 
one of the editions may be merely a copy of the other. In the several editions which ap-
peared both in America and in England in the next forty or fifty years, some ren• 
dered the French word pacte as "pact" and some as "compact." Since the appearance of 
Chitty's edition in 1833, "compact" has been the uniformly preferred term and there is 
no distinction in meaning; .Because it was the French, and not any English version, 
with which th<: constitutional draftsmen were probably most familiar (sec note · 62 
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arrangements which do not contemplate repeated acts of perform-
ance, but rather make one final disposition of the parties' claims 
or rights. Boundary settlements and agreements as to rights and 
jurisdiction over boundary waters fall within this class. Vattel re-
ferred to these "compacts" and "agre.ements" as transitory arrange-
ments, but he did i:iot mean to imply by that term that they were 
of lesser significance or merely temporary in effect. On the contrary, 
Vattel emphasized that "compacts" or "agreements" are perpetual; 
a right surrendered to another by "compact" no longer belongs to 
the one who surrendered it and can never be reclaimed.65 
The failure of some commentators to recognize that it was not 
the temporal connotations of the term "transitory" which Vattel 
intended has been instrumental in obscuring the Vattelian origins 
of the constitutional distinction between "compacts" and "treaties."68 
In its more etymological sense, the term also connotes transference 
-the movement of rights out of the hands of one party into those 
of another. It is this meaning of the term "transitory" that Vattel 
apparently intended. Westlake has suggested that the term "disposi-
tive" would make the concept clearer than "transitory."67 Thus, 
we find in Vattel a distinction between those international arrange-
ments which are dispositive-for example, boundary settlements and 
cessions-and all others, which are nondispositive-for example, 
treaties of commerce and treaties of alliance. Vattel referred to the 
former group as "agreements" or "compacts"; the latter he called 
"treaties."68 
The distinction between dispositive and nondispositive interna-
tional arrangements was not original with Vattel, although the 
representation of that distinction by a technical usage of the terms 
"treaty" and "agreement or compact" apparently was. The dis-
pos_itive-nondispositive differentiation is, traceable back at least to 
supra), they may have preferred to translate the term as "compact" rather than "pact." 
Thus, the fact that the Constitution speaks of "compact," while most of the early 
translations of Vattel speak of "pact," cannot be raised as an objection to the argument 
deriving the constitutional terminology from Vattel. 
65. VATTEL, op. cit. supra note 62, § 192. Of course, the effect of a "compact" 
could be altered or reversed by a subsequent "compact" between the parties. 
66. See note 76 infra. · 
67: 1 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 60-61 (1904). Westlake gives an explanation 
of Vattel's term "transitory" slightly different from, but not inconsistent with, that 
given above. 
68. VATTEL, op. cit. supra note 62, §§ 152, 153, 192, 206. Vattel, to ,be sure, 
equivocated between this narrow usage of "compacts" and a broader usage which 
encompassed all arrangements including "treaties." Similarly, he equivocated between 
the narrow usage of "treaties" as excluding dispositive arrangements and the broader 
usage which encompassed all arrangements including "compacts" and "agreements." 
78 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:63 
Pufendorf,69 and after Vattel, the distinction-but not Vattel's ter• 
min~logy70-found consistent recognition among the international 
jurists of the nineteenth and even the twentieth century.71 Whatever 
the degree of its significance in contemporary international practice, 
it is certain that this distinctiop. between dispositive and nondisposi• 
tive arrangements has long been recognized in international legal 
theory. 
Vattel's distinction between "treaties" and "agreements" or 
"compacts" appeared in a widely circulated work, the authority of 
which is known to have been generally, if not universally, accepted 
during the period in which the Constitution was conceived and 
adopted. Moreover, there is no other distinction between these terms 
which could provide a meaningful frame of reference for interpreta-
tion of the compact clause72 and which was known to have had such 
currency in America during the formative period as would explain 
the cavalier treatment of it in the Federalist Papers.78 It seems 
to be strongly suggested by these circumstances that this was the 
distinction intended to be drawn by the draftsmen of article I, 
section 10.74 This conclusion is corroborated by the earliest of com-
mentators upon that section, St. George Tucker.w Judge Tucker 
69. While suggesting that a succeeding ruler's obligation under a foedera which 
was concluded by his predecessor might depend upon numerous factors, Pufendorf 
noted that " 'tis beyond dispute, that the Successor is obliged to stand to all those 
lawful Agreements [conventiones], by which his Predecessor transferred any Right 
to a Third Person." PuFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, bk. VIII, ch. 
IX, § VIII (1704). 
70. The significance of the deviations from Vattel's terminology for the construc-
tion of the compact clause of the Constitution is explored in Part III of this study, 
infra. · 
71. The distinction between dispositive and nondispositive international arrange• 
ments was discussed by such early sources as MARTENS, LAW OF NATIONS, bk. II, ch. 1, 
§ 3 (Cobbett transl. 1795); WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 296-301 (1836). 
The most recent discussions appear in McNAIR, THE LAw OF TREATIES 5 (1961); 1 
WESTLAKE, op. cit. supra note 67, at 60-61; McNair, The Functions and Differing Legal 
Character of Treaties, 11 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 100 (1930) ("treaties having the character of 
conveyances'). 
72. The term "compact" appears in the "social contract" literature of the eight• 
eenth century, l>ut in that context the term is never counterposed to "treaty." Fur• 
thermore, it could hardly be argued that the constitutional framers contemplated 
arrangements between states of such organic significance as that meaning of the term 
"compact" would import. 
73. See text accompanying note 60 supra. 
74. This writer is aware that he -is not the first to find the source of the consti-
tutional language in Vattel's treatise. See Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the 
Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Compacts"!, 3 U. Cm. L. REv. 453 
(1936). Weinfeld, however, made no attempt to show the significance of this finding 
for modem interstate relations. 
75. Although not a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Tucker was a 
prominent statesman of the period. Along with Edmond Randolph and James Madi-
son, he had been a commissioner of Virginia to .the Annapolis Convention of 1786. 
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supported this construction with a direct citation to the passage from 
Vattel discussed above.76 
B. The Vattelian Explanation of the Compact Clause 
Vattel's distinction between "treaties" and "agreements" or "com-
pacts" is also helpful in the interpretation of the analogous provi-
sions in the Articles of Confederation,77 which contained separate 
provisions concerning the diplomatic intercourse of individual states 
with foreign nations and with each other. Without first obtaining 
the consent of Congress, no individual state could "enter into any 
conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or 
State."78 The limitation as to interstate diplomatic relations was 
significantly different: "No two or more States shall enter into any 
treaty, confederation or alliance whatever between them, without 
the consent"79 of Congress. These restrictions upon the formation 
of confederations or alliances by individual states either with foreign 
nations or with sister states were an evident attempt to preclude the 
disruption of the Union by divergent allegiances. Witµ. respect to 
foreign nations, the additional restrictions on "conferences," "agree-
ments," and "treaties" comported with the general purpose of the 
Articles to consolidate international relations by placing the whole 
of the States' international intercourse under joint surveillance. 
Although the restriction on arrangements betJveen sister states 
covered "treaties," this provision contained no reference to "agree-
ments," and thus contrasted with the clause defining state relations 
with foreign powers. On the assumption that the draftsmen of the 
Articles had in mind the terminology of Vattel, this omission is 
susceptible of a logical explanation. Congressional surveillance over 
"treaties" between sister states would have been necessary to assure 
that the parties did not use such arrangements as a device to violate 
their obligations to all the other states. However, the term "agree-
76. 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, app. at 309-10 (1803). Tucker's restate-
ment of the Vattelian distinction was not faithful. He misconstrued Vattel's use of 
the term "transitory" (see text accompanying notes 65-67 supra), and this was, in part 
at least, the reason for Story's rejection of Tucker's Vattelian interpretation of the 
compact clause. 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION- OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1397 (1st ed. 1833) (in subsequent editions, § 1403). See text accompanying notes 
4-10 supra. Furthermore, Vattel did not limit "agreements" or "compacts" to local 
affairs, nor to arrangements which could not affect any other interest than those of 
the parties; yet Tucker did insert this limitation and relied on Vattel for authority. 
Tucker is significant, nonetheless, for his recognition that Vattel was the source of 
the constitutional distinction between "treaties" and "agreements or compacts." 
77. ART. OF CONFEDERATION art. VI. 
78. Ibid. 
. 79. Ibid. 
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ments" was understood to include only dispositive arrangements, 
which in colonial practice had been utilized primarily in settlements 
affecting territorial boundaries and rights in boundary waters.80 
It is understandable that mere boundary arrangements between 
particular states would not have been thought potentially harmful 
to the other states. Special provision for the disposition of such 
interstate disputes as might arise if a boundary could not be settled 
by agreement, or if a boundary agreement itself should give rise 
to a dispute, was made in article IX. Thus, it seems reasonable 
for the draftsmen of the Articles to have provided for joint sur-
veillance of territorial agreements between a state and a foreign 
nation, which in case of subsequent contest could embroil all of 
the states in an international conflict, while leaving unimpeded the 
power of the states to conclude such agreements inter sese. 
In the Constitution, unlike the Articles, diplomatic relations 
between the states and foreign nations and between the states them-
selves are treated together. The states are denied all power to con-
clude "treaties," whether with foreign nations or with sister states, 
and, in contrast to the Articles, the prohibition is not qualified by 
the possibility of congressional consent. This complete removal of 
the states' "treaty" power (bearing in mind the narrower meaning 
of "treaty" as used by Vattel) is not difficult to understand when 
one takes into account the whole new scheme of the Constitution. 
- The matters which might otherwise have been dealt with by treaties 
benveen the states or between states and foreign powers were, 
under the new Constitution, brought within the competence of 
the federal government. Nevertheless, there were unresolved prob-
lems among the several states which might still become, as they had 
under the Articles, subjects of "compacts" or "agreements." 
The requirement of congressional consent to such agreements 
with -foreign powers was continued, probably for the same reasons 
that it had been included in the Articles of 1777. However, the 
Constitution extended the consent requirement to compacts and 
80. See Rundle v. Delaware- & Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80 (1852), 
affirming 21 Fed. Cas. 6 (No. 12139) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (proprietary acts of N.J. and 
Pa., 1771, regarded as a compact); Bennett v. Boggs, 3 Fed. Cas. 221 (No. 1319) 
(C.C.D.N.J. 1830) (compact between people and proprietaries of N.J., 1676). The 
lack of any federal surveillance over such arrangements was one element in the 
Articles which seems to have troubled the Federalists. See Madison, Preface to Dt:• 
bates in the Convention of 1787, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 539, 548 (Farrand rev. ed. 1937). Either ignorance of, or Antifederalist resist-
ance to, the change wrought by the compact clause of the Constitution may account 
for the failure of several states to submit boundary compacts for consent even after 
1800. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. 
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agreements with sister states, even though these arrangements had 
not been subject to congressional surveillance under the Articles. 
The explanation for"this change also seems quite logical. The Con-
stitution did not provide any special means for the settlement of 
interstate territorial disputes, as had the ninth article of confedera-
tion, and the jurisdiction of the new federal judiciary over interstate 
controversies other than with the consent of each of the party states, 
and in particular over questions of disputed boundaries, 81 was far 
from certain. Congressional surveillance over compacts or agreements 
between the states was therefore not only a check on the remote 
possibility of territorial arrangements upsetting to the structure-
of the Union,82 but also the only certain means by which the Union 
could preclude subsequent controversies over such agreements by 
assuring clarity and fairness in their terms and purposes. 
Ill. NINETEENTH CENTURY ADUMBRATION 
If it was Vattel's distinction between dispositive and nondis-
positive arrangements which was adverted to in article I, section 
10, the promptness and permanence with which that meaning of 
the section was obscured demand explanation. 
It was not long after the incorporation of the terms "treaty," 
"compact," and "agreement" into the Constitution to indicate the 
distinction between dispositive and nondispositive arrangements, 
that the recognized distinction· between these terms began to be 
eroded away. Even Vattel had not confined himself strictly to the 
narrower signification of these terms, for he occasionally used both 
"compact" and "treaty" in a broader sense to include arrangements 
of every sort.83 The next ,vriter of significance to repeat Vattel's 
distinction was Martens, who wrote in France during the very years 
when the Americans were creating their Constitution. Since Martens' . 
work84 was not published until after the Americans' work was 
done and did not reach this continent until 1794, 86 it is clear that 
81. It was not until Rhode Island 8: Providence Plantations v. Massachusetts, 37 
U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838), that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over boundary 
controversies was established. 
82. "By the compact of 1820, Tennessee acquired nearly half a million of acres 
north of 36 degrees 30 minutes; if she could go to ten miles north, she might two 
hundred, and purchase out a sister state, sapping the foundations· of the Union." 
Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 206 (1837) Gohn Catron, counsel for defendant 
in error). 
83. VATIEL, op. cit. supra note 62, §§ 152, 153, 192, 206. 
84. MARTENS, PRECIS DU DROIT DES GENS MODERNES DE L'EUROPE FONDE SUR LES TRAITES 
ET L'USAGE (1788). 
85. See the translator's advertisement in the London edition of 1802. MARTENS, LAw 
OF NATIONS, at v (Cobbett transl. 1802). 
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his terminology could have had no influence upon the choice of 
words by the constitutional draftsmen. 
Nevertheless, Martens' writing has contributed to the clouding 
of the draftsmen's intent. In the 1795 American translation of Mar-
tens' first edition, the term "treaties" was used freely in its more 
general sense, and the dispositive type of treaty was not denominated 
"compact" or "agreement," but rather "transitory covenant."80 The 
translator of this first edition reported in 1802 that "The President, 
the Vice-President, and every member of the Congress became sub-
scribers to it; and, I believe, there are few law-libraries in the 
United States, in which it is not to be found."87 Among its original 
subscribers also were numbered many of the most prominent lawyers 
of that day, including several who were, or were to become, Justices 
of the Supreme Court.88 It would not be accurate to say that Martens 
displaced Vattel as the leading authority on international law;80 
but considering the wide circulation of his treatise, the exclusive 
use in this translation of Martens of the term "covenants," and the 
exclusive use in the Constitution of the terms "compact" and "agree-
ment," Martens may be seen as having contributed to the disasso-
ciation of the constitutional provision from the recognized distinc-
tion between types of international arrangements. 
The American writer Henry Wheaton published his Elements 
of International Law in 1836; while he recognized and utilized the 
distinction between dispositive and nondispositive arrangements, he 
used only the term "conventions" to refer to the dispositive type.00 
Wheaton also used the term "compact," but only in the broadest 
sense, to include arrange~ents of all sorts, including those properly 
called "treaties."01 Throughout the course of the nineteenth century, 
common international usage eroded away even the distinctive signif-
icance of the term "conventions," and if there was any terminological 
distinction drawn in practice, it was the reservation of the term 
86. MARTENS, op. cit. supra note 71. In a second and substantially revised edition 
of his work published in 1801, Martens again used the term conventions transitoires, 
but neither pactes (compacts) nor accords (agreements). MARTENS, PRtCis DU DROIT DES 
GENS MODERNES DE L'EUROPE FONDE SUR LES TRAXTES ET L'VSAGE, bk. II, ch. II, § 58 (2d ed. 
1801). 
87. Translator's advertisement in the London edition of 1802. MARTENS, op, cit, 
supra note 85, at v. 
88. See the list of subscribers' names in the Philadelphia edition of 1795. MARTENS, 
LAw OF NATIONS 373 et seq. (Cobbett transl. 1795). 
89. Martens' "is a treatise of greater practical utility, but it is only a very partial 
view of the system, being confined to the customary and conventional law of the 
modem nations of Europe." 1 KENT, op. dt. supra note 61, at 17. Kent had reference 
to the positivistic tenor of Martens' work, as well as its confessedly provincial scope. 
90. WHEATON, op. dt. supra note 71, at 296-301. 
91. Ibid. 
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"convention" for treaties of lesser importance, regardless of their 
_dispositive or nondispositive character. By the end of the nineteenth 
century all of these terminological distinctions had worn so thin 
that Westlake could observe that "the terms are synonymous, and 
even the usage of calling the more important acts treaties, the less 
important ones conventions, is far from being uniformly followed."92 
Although Westlake recognized the distinction between dispositive 
and nondispositive treaties,93 this distinction was no longer repre-
sented by terminological distinctions between "treaties" and "com-
pacts," "agreements," or even "conventions." 
The trend away from precision in terminology and the con-
comitant clouding of the sense of article I, section 10, may be traced 
also in American court decisions and legal literature. Whether the 
term "treaty" was consistently used in its stricter sense in the Con-
stitution itself is an unsettled,94 but nevertheless wholly academic,95 
question. In any event, even among the notable members of the 
first generation American bar, the distinction between "treaties" 
and "compacts" was not always preserved.96 The trend is even 19-ore 
discernible, however, in the second and succeeding generations. 
In 1823, the Supreme Court found occasion to apply the distfoction 
between dispositive and nondispositive treaties in the decision of 
a case, but no distinctive terms such as "compact" or "convention" 
were employed.97 In 1832, Mr. Justice McLean referred to a boundary 
agreement between Kentucky and Tennessee indiscriminately as a 
"compact" and as a "treaty,"98 and similar imprecision in terminol-
ogy was reflected in the argument of the same case on appeal.99 In 
1833, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall did not· hesitate to use the term 
"compact" as an equivalent of "treaty, alliance or confederation."100 
92. 1 WESTLAKE, op. cit. supra note 67, at 279. 
93. Id. at 283-84. 
94. The view that the stricter sense was intended may have been the basis for 
President Jefferson's reluctance to accept the federal "treaty" power as constitutional 
justification for the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. 
95. Even if the framers did intend the stricter meaning of the term "treaty" 
where it is used with reference to federal competence, to argue for anything less than 
the broadest possible construction of the federal treaty power today would be im-
practical to the point of absurdity. 
96. In Sims Lessee v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425, 445 (1799), Lewis, Tilghman, and 
Dallas, attorneys for the petitioner, equivocated in their argument between "treaty" 
and "compact" as the term applicable to the boundary agreement concluded by 
Pennsylvania and Virginia in 1780. 
97. See Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 21 U.S. 
(8 Wheat.) 464, 494-95 (1823). 
98. See Fleeger v. Pool, 9 Fed. Cas. 257 (No. 4860) (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1832). 
99. See Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185 (1837). 
100. See Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 249 
(1833). . 
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Story published his Commentaries in that same year, and, having 
rejected Tucker's Vattelian interpretation of article I, section 10,101 
found no better source than conjecture for an explanation of 
the distinctive significance of these terms.102 Finally, the total ob-
literation of meaningful distinctions between the terms "treaty," 
"compact," "agreement," and "convention" was reflected by Ameri-
can courts in the last decades of the nineteenth century.103 Thus, it 
can be seen that the link between the terms "agreement" or "com-
pact" and the dispositive variety of arrangements had been totally 
lost to the judicial mind.104 
It should also be noted that the term "compact" found its most 
frequent use in 'the nineteenth century among the proponents of 
nullification and secession,105 whose "compact theory" of the Con-
stitution, however it may have comported with the meaning of the 
term "compact" in certain eighteenth century social contract writ-
ings, did not reflect at all Vattel's signification of the term. Indeed, 
their conception of "compact," which was broad enough to include 
even the federal Union, explains why the draftsmen of the Con-
federate Constitution provided that compacts and agreements be-
tween the Confederate States were prohibited, with one minor ex-
ception, 106 as absolutely as were treaties, alliances, and confedera-
tions.107 
IV. EMERGENCE OF THE NEW CONSTRUCTION 
A. Holmes v. ] ennison 
This obscuring of the intended meaning of article I, section 
10, had no effect upon the dispositive type of interstate arrange-
ment, which continued to find employment primarily in the settle-
101. See note 76 supra. 
102. See text accompanying notes 7-16 supra. 
103. In 1870, the New York court indiscriminately used the terms "treaty," "agree• 
ment," "compact," and "convention." People v. Central R.R., 42 N.Y. 283 (1870). 
(Earl, C.J., dissenting, used the term "agreement" in a consistent manner.) In Aitche• 
son v. The Endless Chain Dredge, 40 Fed. 253 (E.D. Va. 1889), the court referred to 
a 1785 agreement between Maryland and Virginia both as a "compact" and as "a 
solemn treaty and convention" between those states. 
104. In Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840), even the quotation of 
Vattel by the Court itself was insufficient to restore the original intent of the consti-
tutional provision. See text accompanying notes 108-13 infra. 
105. St. George Tucker, whose significant, albeit unfaithful, association of Vattel 
with the compact clause has been commented upon in note 76 supra, was an advocate 
of this theory. See 1 TucKER, op. cit. supra note 76, app. at 73-75, 140. 
106. "But when any river divides or flows through two or more States, they may 
enter into compacts with each other to improve the navigation thereof." CONFEDERATE 
STATES OF AMERICA CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, 
107. Ibid. 
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ment of interstate boundaries, but it left the courts without an 
established construction of that constitutional provision against 
which to measure the new varieties of interstate arrangements which 
soon began to appear. The foil for the cases which evolved the 
currently accepted interpretation of the compact clause was Mr. 
Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Holmes v. ]ennison.108 The issue 
in that case was whether an extradition arrangement between the 
governor of Vermont and an official of Canada, entered into with-
out congressional consent, fell under the proscription of the compact 
clause. In deciding that it did, Taney offered this all-encompassing 
interpretation of the Compact Clause: 
The word "agreement," does not necessarily import any direct 
and express stipulation; nor is it necessary that it should be in 
writing. If there is a verbal understanding to which both parties 
have assented, and upon which both are acting, it is an "agree-
ment." And the use of all of these terms, "treaty," "agreement," 
"compact," show that it was the intention of the framers of the 
Constitution to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; 
and that they anxiously desired to cut off all connection or com-
munication between a state and a foreign power: and we shall 
fail to execute that evident intention, unless we give to the 
word ''agreement" its most extended signification; and so apply 
it as to prohibit every agreement, written or verbal, formal or 
informal, positive or implied, by the mutual understanding of 
the parties.109 · 
Taney claimed to find support for his interpretation in Vattel,110 
but this assertion was manifestly unfounded. It should be remem-
bered that Mr .. Justice Story, who fully concurred in, and may 
fairly be assumed to have had some influence in shaping, Taney's 
opinion, had already in his Commentaries rejected Judge Tucker's 
interpretation of the same selection from Vattel.111 Vattel had used 
the terms "compact" and "agreement" as equivalents and as alterna-
tive terms for the dispositive type of treaty. He drew no distinction 
between these terms inter sese. It was not from Vattel, therefore, 
that Taney drew his conclusion that even the most inexplicit, in-
direct, and informal understanding on any subject was an "agree-
ment" in the constitutional sense. Taney construed the language of 
108. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840). The sharp disagreement among the Justices pre-
vented any opinion being delivered as that of the Court. Taney's, however, was the 
principal opinion and enjoyed the full concur-rence of Justices Story, McLean and 
Wayne. 
109. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 572. The Vermont court regarded Taney's opinion as 
controlling. Holmes Ex parte, 12 Vt. 631 (1840). 
110. Ibid. 
111. 3 STORY, op. cit. supra note 76, at § 1396 (in subsequent editions, § 1402). 
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Vattel, and with it that of the Constitution, not as a classification 
of two types of international arrangements, but rather as an ex-
haustive catalog of all possible types of arrangements. This, to be 
sure, does violence to Vattel's intention and to that of the Constitu-
tion's drafters, but for an adherent of Story's construction of article 
I, section IO, there is really no other way to construe Vattel.112 
Taney thought it necessary to construe the constitutional re-
striction on state relations with foreign powers in the broadest 
manner possible. However, since the same restriction applies equally 
to state relations with sister states, a construction so all-encompassing 
as to cut off all possible international arrangements by the states 
might undesirably hamper efforts toward cooperation among mem-
bers of the federation. This was one factor which disinclined the 
other members of the Court, and in particular Mr. Justice Catron,118 
from joining with Justices Taney, Story, McLean and Wayne to 
make their opinion in Holmes-v. Jennison that of the Court. 
B. Counterthrust-Virginia v. Tennessee 
The technological advances of the first half of the nineteenth 
century, along with the redirection of the attention of the country 
toward the improvement of overland travel and communications, 
created new occasions for cooperation among the states. The increas-
ing need for roads, railroads, and canals, in particular, occasioned 
new varieties of interstate arrangements not contemplated in 1787.114 
At the outset, it seems, there was little thought given to the possible 
applicability to these arrangements of the compact clause. States 
acted as co-incorporators of companies commissioned to construct 
interstate bridges115 and canals,116 and no congressional approval 
was sought.117 States agreed, without federal sanction, to grant each 
other the privilege of extending their railroads into one another's 
112. Taney's opinion in Holmes v. Jennison actually ojfers no help in distinguish• 
ing between "treaties" and "compacts" or "agreements" under § 10; it decides only 
that the meaning of one of these three terms, "agreements," is large enough to include 
whatever the other two do not. 
113. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 597. Cf. Fisher v. Steele, 39 La. Ann. 447, 1 So. 882 (1887). 
114. For an excellent study of cooperative activities among states up to about 1830, 
see Abel, Interstate Cooperation as a Child, 32 IowA L. REv. 203 (1947), 
115. See Dover v. Portsmouth Bridge, 17 N.H. 200 (1845). 
116. See Chesapeake&: Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore &: O.R.R., 4 Gill &: J. l (Md, 
1832). See also Mackay v. New York, N.H. &: H.R.R., 82 Conn. 73, 72 Atl. 583 (1909). 
117. Congressional accession was thought necessary and was sought in the case of 
the Chesapeake &: Ohio Canal Company, but only for those improvements which 
were placed within the District of Columbia. Act of March 3, 1825, 4 Stat. 101. See 
Chesapeake &: Ohio Canal Co. v • .Baltimore &: O.R.R., supra note 116. 
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territory,118 and projected the cooperative construction of improve-
ments within sister states.119 Whether because of the influence of 
Taney's all-inclusive construction of the compact clause, or because 
of their relation to subjects of federal concern, after 1840 a few 
of the new cooperative arrangements were considered-by Congress 
at least-to require federal consent.120 Nevertheless, these coopera-
tive efforts were generally undertaken without federal surveillance. 
Even after Taney's opinion in Holmes v. Jennison, state courts, 
reflecting the impatience of the states ·with the onerous requirement 
of consent to this new variety of interstate arrangements, held various 
arrangements to be outside the compact clause. One means of doing 
so was simply to deny that there was any consensus underlying the 
separate acts of two states authorizing an interstate improvement.121 
However, a more conscientious approach to the task was taken by 
the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1853, when it admitted that some 
sort of "agreement" underlay the complementary acts of the two 
states, but denied that it came within the scope of the compact 
clause.122 
The Georgia court's' opinion was a direct affront to Taney's 
interpretation and set the course which subsequent decisions were to 
follow in establishing the modem construction of the compact 
clause. Since the Vattelian origins of the constitutional language 
had already been obscured, the Georgia court turned instead to the 
Commentaries of Mr. Justice Story. Overlooking the significance of 
Story's unqualified concurrence in Taney's all-inclusive interpreta-
tion of the clause, 123 this court became the first to claim Story as 
authority for the exemption of certain arrangements from the re-
quirement of consent.124 The Georgia court interpreted the clause 
thus: 
[T]his prohibition applies only to such an "agreement or com-
pact" as is in its nature political; or more properly, perhaps, such 
as may, in any wise, conflict with the powers which the States, by 
the adoption of the Federal Constitution, have delegated to the 
General Government .... 125 
118. See Union :Branch R.R. v. East Tenn. &: Ga. R.R., 14 Ga. 327 (1853). See also 
St. Louis &: S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896). 
119. See Fisher v. Steele, 39 La. Ann. 447, 1 So. 882 (1887). 
120. E.g., joint action by Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas to render the Red River 
navigable, 12 Stat. 250 (1861); concurrent legislation by New York and Canada incor-
_porating the International :Bridge Company to span the Niagara River at Buffalo, 16 
Stat. 173 (1870). 
121. See Dover v. Portsmouth :Bridge, 17 N.H. 200 (1845). 
122. Union Branch R.R. v. East Tenn. &: Ga. R.R., 14 Ga. 327 (1853). 
123. See text accompanying note 111 supra. 
124. Union Branch R.R. v. East Tenn.&: Ga. R.R., 14 Ga. 327, 339 (1853). 
125. Ibid. 
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Other courts thought the inapplicability of the compact clause too 
obvious to merit even serious deliberation.126 
There were two cases which followed the construction urged by 
Taney in Holmes v. ]ennison,121 but both of these involved "agree-
ments" between a state and a foreign power rather than between 
sister states. It is understandable that greater circumspection should 
have been manifested in judging arrangements with foreign powers 
than arrangements between sister states, but this need not have led to 
a harsh construction of the compact clause. Arrangements with 
foreign powers must satisfy other constitutional requirements than 
those imposed by the compact clause. Indeed, a coordinate argument 
in Taney's Holmes v. Jennison opinion, for which that opinion has 
since been endorsed by the Supreme Court,128 emphasized this 
fact.129 It was not necessary, therefore, in order to prevent abuse of 
the states' power of international intercourse, to impose upon the 
compact clause a construction so harsh as to inhibit cooperative 
arrangements between sister states. 
It was not until the last decade of the nineteenth century that the 
scope of article I, section IO, found exposition in a majority opinion 
of the Supreme Court. In Virginia v. Tennessee,130 which was dis-
cussed in Part I above, the interstate arrangement actually at stake 
was of the older, dispositive variety, but an awareness of the signifi-
cance of its decision for the newer, cooperative type of arrangement 
is evident in the Court's opinion.131 The frequently quoted language 
of Virginia v. Tennessee need not be repeated at great length here. 
The substance of the decision is that the terms "compact" and 
126. E.g., Fisher v. Steele, 39 La. Ann. 447, 454, 1 So. 882, 888 (1887). 
127. Holmes Ex parte, 12 Vt. 631 (1840). But see Redfield, J., dissenting, id. at 646-
47; People ex rel. Barlow v. Curtis, 50 N.Y. 321, 326-30 (1872). 
128. See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
129. Taney argued that extradition fell within the treaty power of the federal 
government and that the e.xercise by a state of any power in international extra• 
dition, even in the absence of any positive exercise of the federal power, would be 
inconsistent with the existence of that power in the federal government. Holmes v. 
Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 574 (1840). 
130. 148 U.S. 503 (1893). 
131. By the use of four examples, the Court sought to show the absurdity of 
requiring consent to arrangements which would not concern the federal government: 
first, where a state wishes to arrange for the acquisition of land lying within its 
borders but currently owned by a second state; second, where one state wishes to 
transport goods on a canal running through a second state; third, where neighboring 
states wish to cooperate in draining a disease-infested swamp on their common border; 
and fourth, where cooperative action is necessary to meet the threat of some plague 
or other menace to life and health. See 148 U.S. at 518. Of these four examples, the 
first two are mere contracts of a private-law character made by states and should not 
be construed as within the compact clause under any construction, Cf. note 174 infra. 
However, the latter two are examples of cooperative arrangements of the type here 
under discussion. 
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"agreement" import different degrees of formality or seriousness, 
but both denote declarations based upon mutual considerations; in 
the context of the compact clause, both terms are limited to com-
binations "tending to the increase of political power in the [ affected] 
States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy 
of the United States."132 To justify this conclusion, the Court claimed 
support from Story's Commentaries,183 as had the Georgia court 
before it.134 
The opinion in Virginia v. Tennessee, with its citation to Story, 
was quoted at length the following year to decide the question raised 
in Wharton v. Wise: 135 whether an interstate arrangement entered 
into under the Articles of Confederation was invalid under the 
provisions of article VI thereof relating to interstate "treaties." The 
Court ruled that this term in the Articles, like "compact" and "agree-
ment" in the Constitution, was limited to arrangements which 
"encroach upon or weak.en the general authority of Congress."136 
Thus, this one criterion originated by Story is now used with equal 
facility to distinguish between "treaties" and "agreements or com-
pacts" and between classes within each of these categories as well. 
In this fashion, at the close of the nineteenth century, the para-
doxical construction of article I, section IO, was established; it has 
persisted until this day. It evolved from an effort to eliminate the 
burdensome requirement of congressional consent from the new 
types of cooperative interstate arrangements which emerged during 
that century. At that time, no better legal rationale to accomplish 
that purpose was known. Enough has been said already in criticism of 
the rule of Virginia v. Tennessee;131 we must now explore the advan-
tages of the interpretation based upon Vattel, as applied to interstate 
arrangements of today. 
V. TWENTIETH CENTURY .APPLICATION OF . 
ARTICLE I, SEGIION 10 
In this country, cooperative arrangements between the states have 
come of age in the present century. Because of the label they bear, 
132. 148 U.S. at 519. 
133. Although the Court's introduction of the passage from Story gives the impres-
sion that it is offered as an analogy only, substantive analysis will show that Story's 
distinction between the first and third clauses of art. I, § 10, was being applied 
squarely to the third clause alone. · 
134. See text accompanying notes 123-25 supra. 
135. 153 U.S. 155 (1894). 
136. Id. at 170. 
137. See Part I (C) 8: (D) supra. 
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the qualified prohibition of the compact clause, softened only by the 
dubious rule of Virginia v. Tennessee, is generally assumed to be 
applicable to these modem "compacts." The error of this assumption 
can be shown through more careful characterization. 
A. Characterization of International Arrangements 
The · new examples of American interstate arrangements have 
their counterparts on the international scene.188 The writers on 
international law, however, have recognized this new type of arrange-
ment as distinctly different from those employed up through the 
eighteenth century. The earliest adequate statement of the character 
of the new variety of international arrangement was that of Hein-
rich Triepel in 1899.189 Triepel argued that formal140 international 
arrangements can be classified into two categories: Vertrage141 and 
Vereinbarungen.142 This is a different distinction from that drawn 
by Vattel. As will soon be evident, both dispositive and nondisposi-
tive arrangements fall within Triepel's category, Vertrage. 
The basis of Triepel's classification is the relationship of the 
interests and wills of the several parties to one another. Triepel 
uses the term V ertrag in a strict sense to mean only those arrange-
ments which arise from parties having different but complementary 
interests. The analogy to private law contracts--for example, a sale 
or exchange of goods-is suggested.143 In contrast, the term Verein-
barung is applied to arrangements which arise from parties sharing 
a single, mutual interest.144 The essential characteristic of the 
Vereinbarung is this identity of interests and objectives of the parties; 
the best analogy in private law might be a joint act or undertaking. 
In short, V ertrag designates a transactional arrangement, while 
Vereinbarung designates a cooperative arrangement. As examples of 
Vereinbarungen, Triepel offered instances where two or more 
1.38. See notes 164-66 infra. 
1.39. TRIEPEL, VoLKERRECHT UNO LANDESRECHT (1899). Triepel was enlarging upon a 
terminological distinction drawn in BINDING, DIE GRUNDUNG DES NORDDEUTSCHEN BUNDES 
(1889). Triepel's theory was expressed again in an article, Les Rapports Entre le Droit 
Inteme et le Droit International, l RECUEIL DES CouRS DE L'ACADEMIE DU DROIT INTER• 
NATIONAL 77 (1923). 
140. Triepel distinguished less formal arrangements. TRIEPEL, op. cit. supra note 
1.39, at 66-67. 
141. This is a technical usage of the term Vertrag, which in ordinary usage is 
approximately equivalent to the English terms "contract" and "treaty." 
142. This is a technical usage of the term Vereinbarung, which in ordinary usage 
means simply any agreement or arrangement. 
143. A wants what B can give him, and B wants what A is willing to give in 
exchange. See TRIEPEL, op. cit. supra note 1.39, at 45. 
144. Both A and B want the same thing, attainable by their mutual endeavor. 
See Triepel, op. cit. supra note 139, at 67-68. 
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nations had undertaken joint action or cooperatively exercised their 
respective powers over a single territory or. subject matter.145 
Arrangements between states to form various administrative 
unions, 146 or to form a confederation or a federal state, Triepel also 
classified as Vereinbarungen.147 Vertriige, according to Triepel, may 
create or destroy rights148 in each contracting party vis-a-vis the other, 
but they cannot establish general legal principles.149 By means of a 
. Vereinbarung, however, states may legislate conjointly; they may 
jointly create objective law.150 
In the development of this classification, Triepel was concerned 
·with buttressing the positivistic theory that objective principles of 
international law had their origin in the wills and agreement of 
states.151 That purpose, and consequently the arguments which have 
since been made against the sharpness of the distinction between 
Vertriige and Vereinbarungen,152 do not concern us here. For our 
purposes, it is not necessary to argue that Vertriige and V ereinba-
rungen are sharply distinguishable with respect to the inter-relation of 
the wills and interests of their parties or their possibilities as sources 
of international . law. It is only necessary to recognize the major 
145. "Two states, which stand in a relation of joint domination over a single 
region, • • • bring themselves to agreement over the granting of a servitude in such 
region in favor of a third state, or over the appointment of magistrates; several states, 
which have undertaken a joint protectorate over another, agree upon discipline, thus 
exhibiting their joint exercise of the common protectorate. These are Vereinbarungen, 
not Vertriige." Ibid. [The translations in this and all succeeding footnotes are- by the 
present writer unless othenvise indicated.] 
146. E.g., the Universal Postal Union, founded in 1874; the Copyright Union, 
founded in 1836. 
147. TRIEPEL, op. cit. supra note 139, at 68. The nineteenth and twentieth century 
concept of confederation or federation is distinguishable from the concept of alliance, 
which Triepel classified as Vertrag. However, in · historical perspective the distinction 
emerged gradually. 
148. In continental terminology, subjective rights, as distinguished from objective 
law. 
149. TRIEPEL, op. cit. supra note 139, at 70. 
150. Ibid. "The rules of the Vienna Congress concerning the freedom of navigation 
and the rank of diplomatic agents, the Declaration of Paris of 1856 (concerning 
maritime law), the Geneva Convention of 1864, the Petersburg Convention of 1868, 
• • • and also numerous treaties concerning the law of prize at sea, blockades, 
contraband, • • • treaties, under which all future controversies of the contractants 
may be determined by arbitration, etc.-all these are not Vertriige in the proper 
sense of the word, but Vereinbarungen of the sort which create objective law." Id. at 
70-71. 
151. Two other writers who shared this view were :Bergbohm (see note 153 infra) 
and Oppenheim; the latter introduced this theory into Anglo-American legal litera-
ture. See 1 OPPENHEIM, !Nn:RNATIONAL LAW §§ 18, 492, 555-68 (1906). 
152. See, e.g., GUIL, INTERNATIONELL RXn 14-15 (1955); GIHL, INTERNATIONAL LEGIS-
LATION 12 (Charleston transl. 1937); KELSEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 319-20 (1952); l.AUTER-
PACHT, PRIVATE I.Aw SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL I.Aw 158-59 (1927); 
1 SCHWARZENBERGER, MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (4th ed. 1960); SCHWARZEN• 
BERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 421 (3d ed. 1957). 
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difference between them, which is suggested by their descriptions 
and examples and even by the etymology of the terms. It should also 
be noted that this new characterization of formal international 
arrangements was not merely a new classification of ancient examples, 
but rather reflected the nineteenth century diversification of inter-
national arrangements into previously unknown forms. 
Neither Triepel nor his predecessor Bergbohm163 found genuine 
examples of. the cooperative sort of arrangements which Triepel 
denominated Vereinbarungen prior to the Congress of Vienna in 
1815. There may have been prototypes of the Vereinbarung which 
antedated the nineteenth century,154 but "the old treaty which pre-
dominated until the Congress of Vienna155-treaties of peace, alli-
ance, friendship, neutrality, guarantee, commerce, &c.-was essen-
tially the Vertrag .... "156 "Eighteenth century conditions did not 
necessitate the elaborate cooperation of numerous states. Many new 
fields for international action were opened up by the industrial 
revolution and by the improvements of the means of communication 
and transportation which characterized the first half of the nine-
teenth century."157 
Just criticism has been directed at attempts to give the distinction 
between Vertriige and Vereinbarungen too deep a significance,168 and 
it is recognized that the distinction is not always easily169 or meaning-
153. About twenty years before Triepel published his treatise, Carl Dergbohm 
bad distinguished between treaties which are essentially transactions between the 
party states, "for example, peace treaties, treaties of federation, treaties of succession, 
transactions concerning servitudes in favor of one state in territory of another, ex• 
changes of jurisdiction, and all economic favors" and those which are actually legal 
principles-treaties by which the party states expressly agree upon uniform rules to 
govern their future affairs. BERGBOHM, STAATSVERTRAGE UND GESETZE ALS QUELLEN DES 
VoLKERRECHTs 80 (1877). In the latter class belong "all the conventions concerning 
the law of war, concerning the rights and obligations of neutrals, concerning the 
[conditions for the] extradition of criminals, concerning the international protection 
of copyrights, concerning institutions for the advancement of trade and commerce, 
concerning certain ceremonies, etc." Id. at 81. 
154. E.g., the confederation, as it began to become distinguishable from mere alli• 
ances during the later eighteenth century; instances of joint rule by allied conquerors; 
the ancient Swiss Pfaffenbrief and Sempacher Brief (see Huber, The Intercantonal 
Law of Switzerland, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 69-70 {1909)); stipulations of articles of 
contraband (see 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 799 (2d rev. ed. 1945)). 
155. "I do not overlook such earlier treaties as those cited by Hyde, International 
Law, Vol. II, § 799, for the denomination of contraband.'' [Renumbered footnote from 
original text.] 
156. McNair, The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties, 11 BRIT, 
YB. INT'L L. 100, 105 (1930). 
157. 1 INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION xviii (Hudson ed. 1931). 
158. See GIHL, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 51-52 (Charleston transl. 1937). 
159. "This distinction bas little practical worth, because both kinds of treaties deal 
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fully160 applied in international practice. However, the abstract 
validity of the distinction, and the fact that it illustrates significant 
changes in the character of international relations since the close of 
the eighteenth century, are widely recognized. "The nineteenth 
century made the peoples of the world into an international com-
munity,"161 and the Vereinbarung emerged as a product of, and in 
turn a contributor to, this phenomenon. In part, perhaps, because of 
the original emphasis upon the possibilities of the Vereinbarung as 
a source of objective international law, modern writers refer to this 
class of international arrangements as "law-making treaties"162 or 
occasionally as "international legislation."163 Included within the 
broad scope of these terms, as within Triepel's definition of Verein-
barung, are all those modem international arrangements by which 
are created joint international or supra-national agencies,164 by which 
nations jointly undertake projects beneficial to both or all of the 
parties,165 or by which coordinated efforts toward the solution of 
common problems are assured.166 . 
B. Characterization of Interstate Arrangements in Switzerland 
Although the significance of distinctions in the character of 
treaties for international law may be only slight, such distinctions 
may take on substantial significance in the context of the limited 
diplomatic competence left to constituent states in a federation. The 
employment in the American Articles of Confederation and the 
with the same rules, and most treaties contain not only abstract rules but also 
concrete settlements between parties." l VON DER HEYDTE, VoLKERRECHT 69 (1958). 
160. 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 34C (2d rev. ed. 1945). . 
161. Hudson, The Prospect for International Law in the Twentieth Century, IO 
CORNELL L.Q. 419, 459 (1925). 
162. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 59 (1949); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
§§ 18, 492, 555-68 (1905); accordi- or trattati-normativi, 1 SERENI, Dmrrro INTERNA-
ZIONALE 72, 136 (1956), and id. at vol. 3, p. 1394; tratados-leyes, SIERRA, DERECHO 
INTERNACIONAL PUBUCO 398 (4th ed. 1963); rechtssetzende Vertriige, l VON DER HEYDTE, 
op. cit. supra note 159, at 69; traites-lois, Bourquin, Regles gent!rales du droit de la 
paix, 35 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DU DROIT INTERNATIONALS 55 (1931); conven-
tion-loi, de Visscher, La codification du droit international, 6 REcuEIL DES coURS DE 
L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 329, 370 (1925); and sometimes trattati-accordi, 
GEMMA, APPUNTI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 212-14 (1923); or accords internationaux, 
REUTER, INSTITUTIONS lNTERNATIONALES 94-103 (3d ed., revised, 1962). 
163. See l INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION, op. cit. supra note 157. 
164. See generally Hahn, International and Supranational Public Authorities, 26 
LAW 8: CONTEMP. PROB. 638 (1961). 
165. E.g., international bridges and highways. 
166. E.g., the several opium conventions and numerous arrangements associated 
with the United Nations. 
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Constitution of the distinction between dispositive and nondisposi-
tive arrangements is one illustration. The further distinction 
between transactional and cooperative arrangements-between Ver-
triige and Vereinbarungen-is recognized for interstate purposes 
in the federal system of Switzerland. Our purpose here is not to draw 
analogies between Swiss and American interstate law, but rather to 
demonstrate the approval and utilization within another federation 
of Triepel's theory. The distinction between Vertriige and Verein-
barungen has found in this context a real significance which it has 
never permanently attained in international law. 
Under article 7 of the Swiss federal constitution of 1874, as under 
Article 7 of the previous constitution of 1848, the cantons are for-
bidden to conclude any separate alliances or political treaties. By 
this same section, however, there is specifically reserved to the cantons 
a sphere of diplomatic competence much greater than that expressly 
left to the states by the United States Constitution: the cantons are 
left a very broad power to conclude arrangements with one 
another.167 The cantons are also left a limited international diplo-
matic competence with respect to matters of essentially local 
significance.168 
In contrast to the American compact clause, the distinction drawn 
by the Swiss constitution with respect to intercantonal arrangements 
is not patterned after Vattel; instead, it is patterned after Story,160 
whose Commentaries, then recently translated into French,170 as well 
as the United States Constitution itself, were influential upon the 
Swiss constitution-makers of 1848. The term "treaty" is never used 
in the Swiss constitution in the strict sense urged by Vattel. Rather, 
the term is used in its broad sense to include all formal intercan-
tonal arrangements.171 It is not all "treaties" in the Vattelian sense 
of nondispositive arrangements which are forbidden to the cantons 
167. "The cantons, however, have the right to make agreement [Vcrlwmmnisse, 
conventions] with one another on matters of legislation, administration, or justice." 
Art. 7, Swiss federal constitution (Bundesverfassung, hereinafter cited BV). The trans-
lation of the BV used throughout this paper is that found in 3 PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS 
OF NATIONS (2d ed. 1956). The specification of "matters of legislation, administration 
or justice" does not serve as a limitation upon the power; it is merely a tripartite 
classification of state functions. BURCK.HARDT, KOMMENTAR DER ScHWEIZERISCHEN DUNDES• 
VERFASSUNG VOM 29 MAI 1874, at 74 (1931). 
168. Art. 10, BV. 
169. See text accompanying note 5 supra. 
170. STORY, CoMMENTAlRE SUR LA CONSTITUTION FEDERALE DES l::TATs-UNJs (Odent 
transl. 1843). The translation was of Story's 1833 abridged edition. 
171. This broad scope of the term was manifestly intended where it is used in 
arts. 85(5), 102(7), 113, BV. 
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by the Swiss constitution, but only "treaties of a political character." 
All nonpolitical intercantonal treaties, whether dispositive or not, 
are included in the permissible class designated "agreements" in 
article 7 .172 
In contrast to the situation at the time the American Constitution 
was drafted, arrangements of the kind Triepel would later denomi-
nate Vereinbarungen had emerged and become familiar by the year 
1848. Thus, unlike their American exemplars, and although even in 
1848 (and in 1874, for that matter) the new kind of arrangement had 
not been recognized by the theorists as a distinct species, the Swiss 
constitution-makers did contemplate intercantonal Vereinbarungen 
as well as Vertrage. Once Triepel illustrated the distinction, Swiss 
commentators were quick to argue, and have been persistent in 
arguing, that the right to use both species is constitutionally secured 
to the cantons. Thus, it is declared173 that the treaties which may be 
concluded between cantons with respect to all matters of public 
law174 within cantonal competence may be either transactional175 
(creating legal relations176 between the parties), or rule-making.177 
172. Obviously there is the further implied limitation of the intercantonal treaty-
making power to matters constitutionally within cantonal competence. GIACOMETTI, 
SCHWEIZERISCHES BUNDESSTAATSRECHT 160 (1949). 
173. BOLI.E, DAS !NTERKANTONAI.E RECHT (1907), although now somewhat dated, is 
still cited as the landmark study of the subject. GIACOMETTI, SCHWErZERisCHES BUNDES-
STAATSRECHT (1949), is the leading contemporary commentary on the Swiss federal 
constitution. ~ee also BuRCKHARDT, op. cit. supra note 167. Huber, The Intercantonal 
Law of Switzerland, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 62 (1909), repeats in summary fashion the sub-
stance of the work of Huber's student, Bolle. However, Huber's choice of English 
words to express the Swiss conceptions is sometimes unfortunate and misleading. 
174. Hoheitlichen Materien, im Gegensatz zu privatrechtlichen Materien. GIAco-
METl'I, op. cit. supra note 173, at 160. It is regarded as obvious that the cantons may 
also conclude mere private-law contracts, which are not within the purview of the 
constitutional 'provision. Id. at 160 n.3. 
175. Rechtsgeschiiftlicher. GIACOMETTI, op. cit. supra note 173, at 160. See also 
BOLI.E, op. cit. supra note 173, at 6-7. 
176. Rechtsverhiiltnissen. GIACOMETTI, op. cit. supra note 173, at 160. See also 
BoLI.E, op. cit. supra note 173, at 6-7. 
177. Rechtssetzender. GIACOMETTI, op. cit. supra note 173, at 160. See also BoLLE, 
op. cit. supra note 173, at 6-7. Even the terminology of Triepel-Vertrag and Verein-
barung-was borrowed by the Swiss commentators. See BoLI.E, op. cit. supra note 173, 
at 6-7, 122-23; GIACOMETTI, op. cit. supra note 173, at 159-65. The Swiss, however, 
had their own distinctive term for the non-transactional variety of intercantonal 
arrangement (Vereinbarung) long before Triepel's terminology was introduced. This 
term, "concordat," is widely used outside Switzerland to refer to arrangements be-
tween a civil government and the Holy See, but in Switzerland it has been used, 
since early in the nineteenth century, in a sense practically synonymous with Triepel's 
Vereinbarung. See Huber, supra note 154, at 73 n.3. As to the synonymy of "con-
cordat" and Vereinbarung, see GIACOMETTI, op. cit. supra note 173, at 160-61; BoLI.E, 
op. cit. supra ngte 173, at 124-25. As to distinctions drawn by the Swiss within the 
class "concordat," see generally BoLI.E, op. cit. supra note 173, at 101-06; GIACOMETTI, 
op. cit. supra note 173, at 164 n.32; Huber, supra note 173, at 72-76, 83. 
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For the Swiss commentators, the distinction between inter-
cantonal V ereinbarungen and V ertrage is an important one. Since 
the provisions of article 7 apply to both types of arrangements,178 
the distinction is not significant with respect to the requirement of 
federal surveillance;179 it does, however, provide the basis for the 
application of different rules with respect to cantons' accession to, 
and ·withdrawal from, these arrangements. The commentators have 
concluded that no more than two parties can enter into a strictly 
transactional treaty,180 whether it is dispositive or not, since it is a 
give-and-take affair between the contractants. V ereinbarungen, or 
cooperative arrangements, on the other hand, permit the accession of 
other interested cantons.181 The principles of international law are 
considered applicable to both varieties of intercantonal arrange-
ment.182 However, these principles are qualified by the fact that the 
cantons are not actually international entities, but rather members 
of a federal state; the principles are also subject to the countervailing 
force of customary intercantonal law, the terms of any applicable 
agreement, and S-wiss federal law.183 It is by virtue of peculiarly Swiss 
custom that cantons are accorded an unrestricted right of withdrawal 
from Vereinbarungen, but not from Vertrage.184 
The small size of their country and their cantons, the fact that 
the various agencies of the federal government may be called upon 
to assist in the implementation and enforcement of intercantonal 
arrangements,185 and the nature of most of the problems beyond 
federal competence which might be dealt with by Vereinbarungen 
probably account for the fact that the Swiss have not resorted to the 
178. See note 167 supra and accompanying text. 
179. Federal review of intercantonal arrangements is provided for in Art. 7, DV. 
However, unlike American interstate "agreements or compacts," federal consent is not 
a condition precedent to the validity of these Swiss arrangements. GIACOMEITI, op. 
cit. supra note 173, at 163-64. Federal assent, however, brings such an arrangement 
under federal "prptection." Ibid. 
180. See, e.g., :BoLI.E, op. cit. supra note 173, at 122. 
181. Ibid.; GIAcOMETII, op. cit. supra note 173, at 160-61. 
182. See GIACOMETII, op. cit. supra note 178, at 162. 
183. Ibid. 
184. "Just as a canton may repeal an internal statute, so may it repeal rules of 
law agreed upon in a concordat. A different condition exists, on the other hand, as 
to intercantonal treaties of a transactional nature. These establish contractual rights 
and obligations. For that reason, conformably to that maxim of international law, 
pacta sunt servanda, the freedom of disposition of the separate cantons is withdrawn, 
so that a unilateral retreat from a Jlertrag does not seem permissible.'' GIACOMETI'l, 
op. cit. supra note 173, at 162. The right of withdrawal from a concordat (or Jlerein• 
barung, see note 177 supra) has not always been unqualified. See Huber, supra note 
173, at 75-76. 
185. Arts. 7, 102(2), :BV. See GIAcoMETII, op. cit. supra note 173, at 164. 
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establishment of intercantonal agencies or authorities by V erein-
barungen. The purposes served by many of the Swiss V ereinba-
rungen are the same as those accomplished by uniform state laws in 
the United States.186 Perhaps the most important of these arrange-
ments are those dealing with public assistance and problems of multi-
ple cantonal citizenship.187 In others, cantons bordering on a lake or 
watenvay often join in a common system of navigation, fishing, or 
water-utilization regulation.188 On at least one occasion, several can-
tons have cooperatively formed a company to construct an Alpine 
highway.189 
However, there is nothing in Switzerland to compare, for · 
example, with the Port of New York Authority,190 or even with the 
study and advisory agencies commonly established by "compacts" 
in this country. The more limited variety of Vereinbarungen actually 
employed in Switzerland must be borne in mind when one thinks 
analogically about the law of American interstate arrangements. 
Some principles of the Swiss law-for example, free unilateral with-
drawal-may not be appropriate to varieties of Vereinbarungen not 
employed in Switzerland. However, as was indicated earlier, our 
purpose here is not to draw particular analogies, but only to show 
that Triepel's distinction between transactional arrangements-
Vertriige-and cooperative arrangements--Vereinbarungen-has 
been accepted and successfully applied within the federal system of 
Switzerland. 
C. Comments on the Scope of the Compact Clause 
Triepel's distinction can also be fruitfully applied to the charac-
terization of American interstate arrangements. It bears repeating 
that the whole of Triepel's theory, and the implications which may 
be sought to be built upon it, need not be imported. For our 
purposes it is immaterial that Triepel's categories, like all the neat 
186. See RICE, LAw AMONG STATES IN FEDER.ACY 802-03 (1959). Uniform laws are not 
unknown in Switzerland. Id. at 821 n.13. On the role of Vereinbarungen, or concordats, 
in settling questions of the conflict of laws, see Schoch, Conflict of Laws in a Federal 
State-The Experience of Switzerland, 55 HARv. L. REv. 738 (1942). 
187. See RICE, op. cit. supra note 186, ch. 8; Rice, Intercantonal Public Assistance 
Liability in Switzerland, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 463 (1959). 
188. For a list of intercantonal Vereinbarungen, or concordats, concluded up to 
1907, see BoLLE, op. cit. supra note 173, at 162-204. 
189. See Schindler, The Administration of Justice in the Swiss Federal Court in 
Intercantonal Disputes, 15 AM. J. lNT'L L. 149, 162 (1921). 
190. See generally Leach, Interstate Authorities in the United States, 26 LAW &: 
CONTEMP, PROB, 666 (1961). 
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categories defined by reason, when they are .imposed upon the co-
alescent whole of objective experience may be shown to be in reality 
less distinct than their nominal discreteness suggests. The gist of the 
distinction is clear enough. The kinds of cooperative arrangements 
existing today behveen nations-and between this nation's states-
were unknown in the eighteenth century. They were neither antici-
pated nor provided for by the constitutional draftsmen of 1787. 
This, then, is the conclusion to which mere exegesis leads us. If 
it is considered necessary at the level of exegesis to find these co-
operative arrangements within the restrictive provisions of article I, 
section 10, they must be read into the prohibitive first clause, for 
"treaties" was regarded as the broadest term, even in its stricter 
signification. These cooperative arrangements, whatever they may 
be called, are not dispositive arrangements and therefore are mani-
festly not within the class intended by the statesmen of 1787 when 
they used the terms "agreement" and "compact." Such an exegetical 
construction, however, would render the whole spectrum of formal 
cooperative interstate arrangements unconstitutional, without even 
the possibility of legitimation through congressional consent. Thus, 
it is not only more justifiable in logic, but obviously more desirable 
in practical effect, to regard these cooperative arrangements as out-
side the contemplation of the framers and therefore outside the 
constitutional provision. 
Although this may be the conclusion to which exegesis leads, it 
is not by virtue of that fact alone the answer to the ultimate question 
of the application or interpretation of the constitutional provision 
today. The merit of the exegetical analysis belabored at such length 
here is not that it is in itself decisive of the "proper" application of 
the compact clause, for exegesis is only the first step in constitutional 
construction. Its merit, rather, is that it clears away the debris of 
unsuccessful attempts to acclimate the compact clause to modern con-
ditions and opens the field for the first time to a meaningful discus-
sion of the applicability of that clause as a policy question. 
It is this writer's conviction that the courts, including the 
Supreme Court, have never engaged in the kind of careful delibera-
tion and creative exposition with respect to cooperative interstate 
arrangements which is appropriate when a question of the applica-
tion of the Constitution to unforeseen conditions is raised. Virginia 
v. Tennessee has been uncritically followed because no alternative 
theory has been suggested which could place the exemption of some 
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arrangements, recognized as necessary to make the compact clause 
compatible with modern conditions, upon any sounder legal basis. 
If the argument advanced here is accepted, the way will be open for a 
free determination, on non-exegetical grounds, as to whether co-
operative interstate arrangements should remain wholly outside the 
constitutional provision, or whether some or all of them should 
be brought within either the first or the third clause of article I, 
section 10. 
The Supreme Court's most often professed criterion at this level 
of constitutional construction is the purpose, insofar as it may be 
determinable, underlying a specific provision. Even though such co-
operative interstate arrangements as we know today were not con-
templated by the framers, it would be proper to bring them in under 
article I, section IO, if the purpose which guided the framers in 
drafting that section is still our purpose today and requires their 
inclusion for its effectuation. However, inquiries into constitutional 
"purpose" are essentially deliberations upon policy. Given the 
difficulty of determining with unimpeachable accuracy the policy 
objectives of the framers where they are not evident from the words 
alone, the tendency is for the modern commentator to state the 
framers' conception of the constitutional purpose in a manner bear-
ing striking resemblance to his own. Thus, some commentators have 
stated the purpose behind article I, section 10, in a manner that 
· comports with the rule of Virginia v. Tennessee,191 and this writer 
has already discussed his own understanding of the purpose of the 
framers in terms consistent with the exegetical construction of the 
constitutional provision here propounded.192 Moreover, if the 
Supreme Court were to define the purpose underlying article I, 
section IO, it would surely do so in terms of current notions of 
constitutional purpose. Thus, if it were thought necessary today for 
the protection of the constitutional system, or desirable in point of 
policy, for federal surveillance over cooperative interstate arrange-
ments to be provided, a construction facilitating that result could be 
imposed upon the compact clause. 
However, it is the lack of any such necessity and the un-
desirability of an all-inclusive requirement of consent which are 
most evident. The very statement of the rule of Virginia v. Ten-
191. See Frankfurter &: Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study 
in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 694-95 (1925). 
192. See text accompanying notes 77-82 supra. 
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nessee, purporting to include within the compact clause only politi-
cally disruptive arrangements, of which not a single instance has 
been found in our history,198 is significant. The language of subse-
quent decisions applying that rule to exempt every challenged 
arrangement from the consent requirement is also indicative of 
modem needs.194 Not only the speculative possibility of injury to 
some state through the cooperative action of others, but also the 
substantial benefits to be derived from the facilitation of interstate 
cooperation, must be considered. To the extent that there is any 
real risk of injury to the interests of other states by such arrange-
ments, a better remedy than the dubious palladium of anticipatory 
congressional review is available through interstate suits in the 
Supreme Court, just as if the injury had been done by the separate 
actions of a single state. Almost ·without exception,190 those who are 
actually engaged with interstate arrangements in practice share the 
opinion that federal surveillance of many modern "compacts" is 
unnecessary196 and that it handicaps the states and impairs effective 
cooperation.197 It is certainly clear that limitation, and not extension, 
of the scope of the compact clause has been the keynote of its con-
struction for more than a hundred years. 
It is the opinion of this writer that the new-or rather the older 
and original-constn~ction of the compact clause here suggested 
offers a more analytically defensible and exegetically sound, and, 
most important, more efficacious means of realizing the end hereto-
fore consistently striven for: the facilitation of interstate cooperation. 
193. See note 30 supra. 
194. See cases cited note 32 supra. 
195. The only notable voice raised in dissent has been that of Hon. Emanuel 
Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, which has primary responsi-
bility for compact consent legislation. See, e.g., Celler, Congress, Compacts, and Inter-
state Authorities, 26 I.Aw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 682 (1961). See also the commentary on 
Celler's efforts to extend federal control over compact agencies, 1962-1963 DooK OF 
STATES 263-64. 
196. See, e.g., ZIMMERMAN &: WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACIS 
22-23 (1961), citing specific examples. Cf. Carman, Should the States Be Permitted To 
Make Compacts Without the Consent of Congress?, 23 CORNELL L.Q. 280 (1938). 
197. The requirement of congressional consent to such arrangements also unneces-
sarily encumbers the agenda of Congress. See ZIMMERMAN &: WENDELL, op, cit. supra 
note 196, at 24. "As with any other enterprise, the needless multiplication of and 
delay in procedural requirements can have a withering effect, and the use of inter-
state compacts is no exception." Report of the Committee on Interstate Compacts, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1960 CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL AsSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS 
GENERAL 218 (1961). Congressional tactics with respect to consent to "compacts" have 
on occasion aroused other significant protests from the states. See ZIMMERMAN 1k 
WENDELL, op. dt. supra note 196, at 22. Sec also 1960-1961 DooK OF STATES 239; 1958-
1959 Do01c OF STATES 214-15. 
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Formal arrangements between states may be either transactional 
or cooperative. The first class corresponds to Triepel's category Ver-
trag, the second to Vereinbarung. Those arrangements which are 
transactional may be either dispositive or nonclispositive, as these 
terms were explained in connection with Vattel's theories.198 The 
term "treaty" in the first clause of article I, section 10, is to be under-
stood as encompassing arrangements which are transactional but not 
dispositive; for example, treaties of commerce. Like the other classes 
of arrangements proscribed by that clause-alliances199 and con-
£ederations200-"treaties" in this sense are not devices which states 
under the American constitutional system could properly make use 
of in any case. · 
The terms "compact" and "agreement" as they are used in the 
third clause are to be understood as equivalents, both having exclu-
sive reference to transactional, clispositive arrangements. Under this 
clause, then, must be considered all inter.state boundary "com-
pacts,"201 as well as other dispositive arrangements such as those 
apportioning interstate waters.202 These arrangements are properly to 
be called "compacts" or "agreements" in the constitutional sense, 
and require congressional consent. In contrast, other interstate 
arrangements-those which are cooperative rather than transactional 
-V ereinbarungen-are, just like the several less formal means of 
modem interstate cooperation, "extra-constitutional arrange-
ments,''203 "neither contemplated nor specifically provided for by 
the Constitution."204 To these, which comprise the great majority 
of the more recently executed or projected "compacts," the require-
ment of congressional consent under the compact clause does not -
apply. If there are arrangements which combine both clispositive and 
198. See text accompanying no!es 62-68 supra. 
199. Alliances may be classified as transactional political arrangements. 
200. To the eighteenth century mind, confederations were different from alliances 
only in degree. However, in their modem character they could be more accurately 
described as politically oriented Vereinbarungen. 
201. Interstate boundary "compacts" not affecting the political status of the states 
have been held exempt from the consent -requirement under the rule of Virginia v. 
Tennessee. North Carolina v. Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914); Town of Searsburg v. Town 
of Woodford, 76 Vt. 370, 57 At!. 961 (1904). Even the arrangements exempted in 
Virginia v. Tennessee itself dealt with an interstate boundary. The fact that several 
boundary compacts concluded in the early decades after the adoption of the Consti-
tution were never submitted for consent (see note 14 supra) might indicate that some 
exemption was thought to exist from the outset. But see note 80 supra. 
202. In this class as well should be numbered those arrangements which deal dis-
positively with rights in, or jurisdiction over, boundary waters. 
203. New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 9 (1959). . 
204. Id. at IO, quoting from Frankfurter &: Landis, supra note 191, at 691. 
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cooperative features, consent under the compact clause is required 
only as to the former. 
However, congressional assent to interstate arrangements may be 
sought for other reasons than to satisfy the requirements of the 
compact clause. Some may be submitted in order to secure federal 
assistance in their implementation,205 or strictly out of political con• 
siderations.206 The federal government may even be invited 
to join as a full par~icipant.207 Federal consent might also be sought 
for a more important reason. If there is no doubt that a single state 
may build and operate airport facilities, ports, bridges, or other 
projects affected by federal law, provided that in doing so it abides 
by the applicable stipulations of federal law, then there is no reason 
why two or more states should not be able to do the same thing 
together and be subject only to the same conditions. Finally, if states 
contemplate affirmative regulatory activity in areas where the federal 
government also has competence, the need for specific congressional 
consent should be clear. Consent is required in such a case, not to 
satisfy the requirements of the compact clause, but rather to pre-
clude the operation of the familiar doctrine of federal pre-emption. 
The difference between consent to avoid pre-emption and consent 
to satisfy the compact clause under the rule of Virginia v. Tennessee 
deserves emphasis. When consent is needed only to avoid pre-emp-
tion,208 denial or repeal of congressional consent to state action in the 
federal sphere can occasion only pro tanto invalidity, conditions 
attached to congressional consent to avoid pre-emption can affect only 
those activities within the federal sphere, and congressional investi-
gative power relative to such consent cannot extend to joint state 
activities beyond the federal sphere. To the extent that federal 
205. For e.'GUilple, to make available federal :research staffs and facilities, as under 
the Marine Fisheries Compacts. 
206. W4ile urging that consent not be sought in cases clearly exempted by the 
:rule o.f Virginia -v. Tennessee, the Committee on Congressional Consent to Interstate 
Compacts and Agreements of the National Association of Attorneys General in 1957 
:recognized that even in such cases, it might be "decided to seek such consent for 
policy :reasons." PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1957 CONFERENCE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL 171 (1958). 
207. E.g., The Delaware River :Basin Compact, 75 Stat. 688 (1961). See generally 
Grad, Federal-State Compact-A New Experiment in Co-operative Federalism, 63 
Cowr.r. L. REv. 825 (1963). See also· Dixon, Constitutional Bases for Regionalism-
Centralization; Interstate Compacts; Federal Regional Taxation, 33 GEO. 'WASH, L. 
R.Ev. 47 (1964); Engdahl, Consolidation by Compact: A Remedy for Pre-emption of 
State Food and Drug Laws, 14 J. Pun. L. - (No. 2, 1965). 
208. Compare the consequences of making federal competence the test of the scope 
of the compact clause under the :rul!! of Virginia v. Tennessee, as discussed in text 
accompanying notes 47-48 supra . . 
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powers are affected, but no further, all interstate arrangements must 
be recognized as voidable by congressional action.209 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The continued use of the term "compact" in reference to modem 
cooperative arrangements between states is almost certain to con-
tribute to the perpetuation of the erroneous association of these 
arrangements with the compact clause. The term "agreement," 
because of its parallel usage with "compact" in that clause, is equally 
misleading. However, the use of the term "compact" in a loose 
sense with reference to all sorts of formal interstate arrangements 
has become so widespread that to attempt a refinement of this 
terminology now might well prove futile.210 It is also widely recog-
nized, however, that not all "compacts" in this loose sense· of the 
term fall ·within the compact clause; the test applied for exemption 
has been the rule of Virginia v. Tennessee. Therefore, so long as the 
exegetical meaning of the constitutional terminology is not lost sight 
of, it may be more expedient to tolerate the broader common usage 
of the term "compact" and simply introduce the analysis here 
set forth to displace Virginia v. Tennessee as the test of exemption 
of such "compacts" from the compact clause. 
It should go without saying that the initiative in asserting any 
construction of the compact clause must rest in the first instance 
not with the courts, but rather with the states, which must decide 
whether to submit particular arrangements for consent. Reluctance 
to reject extrajudicially the generally accepted construction of the 
compact clause sliould be overcome at least in part by the wide 
recognition that what this writer has called the "rule"· of Virginia v. 
Tennessee is merely dictum;211 this reluctance should also be dis-
209. Some writers have urged that because of the compact clause, all interstate 
arrangements, including those which deal with wholly local matters, are voidable by 
Congress, even if they do not require congressional consent for their initial validity. 
Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of States With One Another and With Foreign 
Powers, 2 MINN. L. REv. 500, 516 (1918); Dunbar, Interstate Compacts and Congres-
sional Consent, 36 VA. L. REv. 753 (1950). This assertion has no basis in authority. 
Voidability under the doctrine of federal supremacy, on the other hand, rests upon 
authority too well established to require discussion. 
210. There is a strong temptation to import the term "concordat" as used by the 
Swiss (see note 177 supra), since the German term Vereinbarung seems hardly suit-
able for introduction into English, a more familiar and perhaps appropriate term 
would be "convention." However, if the history of th·e compact clause teaches any-
thing, it is that the technical denotations of such terms are quickly obscured and 
forgotten. 
211. See note 22 supra and accompanying text. 
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pelled by the realization that the extrajudicial application of this 
"rule" is different from its application in the courts.212 In time the 
courts, too, will have occasion to consider the various implications 
of adhering to one or another construction of the clause. The liberat-
ing construction of the compact clause here advanced, if its cogency 
is sufficient to establish it in the minds of state officials and the courts, 
may contribute substantially to the freer and more fruitful utiliza-
tion of such cooperative arrangem_ents among the several states. 
212. See text accompanying notes 28-31 supra. 
